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ABSTRACT
The advancement of information technology in coming years will bring significant
changes to the way sensitive data is processed. But the volume of generated data is rapidly
growing worldwide. Technologies such as cloud computing, fog computing, and the Internet
of things (IoT) will o↵er business service providers and consumers opportunities to obtain
e↵ective and efficient services as well as enhance their experiences and services; increased
availability and higher-quality services via real-time data processing augment the potential
for technology to add value to everyday experiences. This improves human life quality and
easiness. As promising as these technological innovations, they are prone to security issues
such as data integrity and data consistency. However, as with any computer system, these
services are not without risks. There is the possibility that systems might be infiltrated
by malicious transactions and, as a result, data could be corrupted, which is a cause for
concern. Once an attacker damages a set of data items, the damage can spread through
the database. When valid transactions read corrupted data, they can update other data
items based on the value read. Given the sensitive nature of important data and the critical
need to provide real-time access for decision-making, it is vital that any damage done by
a malicious transaction and spread by valid transactions must be corrected immediately
and accurately. In this research, we develop three di↵erent novel models for employing fog
computing technology in critical systems such as healthcare, intelligent government system
and critical infrastructure systems. In the first model, we present two sub-models for using
fog computing in healthcare: an architecture using fog modules with heterogeneous data,
and another using fog modules with homogeneous data. We propose a unique approach for

each module to assess the damage caused by malicious transactions, so that original data
may be recovered and a↵ected transactions may be identified for future investigations. In
the second model, we introduced a unique model that uses fog computing in smart cities to
manage utility service companies and consumer data. Then we propose a novel technique
to assess damage to data caused by an attack. Thus, original data can be recovered, and
a database can be returned to its consistent state as no attacking has occurred. The last
model focus of designing a novel technique for an intelligent government system that uses
fog computing technology to control and manage data. Unique algorithms sustaining the
integrity of system data in the event of cyberattack are proposed in this segment of research.
These algorithms are designed to maintain the security of systems attacked by malicious
transactions or subjected to fog node data modifications. A transaction-dependency graph
is implemented in this model to observe and monitor the activities of every transaction. Once
an intrusion detection system detects malicious activities, the system will promptly detect
all a↵ected transactions. Then we conducted a simulation study to prove the applicability
and efficacy of the proposed models. The evaluation rendered this models practicable and
e↵ective.
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1

Introduction

The Internet of Things is the future of the internet and the future is here. However,
current infrastructure is a thing of the past and building stable and reliable infrastructure for
future IoT systems necessitates consideration of the rapid growth in the number of connected
IoT devices. According to estimates, by the year 2025 the number of connected IoT devices
will be 75 billion [1] and produce about 79 zettabytes of data every day [2]. Further estimates
indicate that by 2030 the number of connected devices will reach 125 billion [3].
The information systems currently in use cannot adequately process and transfer to
the cloud the huge amount of data generated by this growth. Systems are further compromised by the limitations and restrictions on bandwidth. The rise in the number of IoT
devices will create more sensitive and real-time IoT usage in connected car technologies,
real-time production line monitoring, health monitoring, and video conferencing and further compromise data processing in an inadequate infrastructure. These applications need
low-latency and location awareness for optimal operations [4]. The cloud and internet infrastructure and resources, in their current form, are simply incapable of managing the huge
amount of data produced by this growth in the internet of things [5].

1.1

Fog Computing
To address these issues and the inadequacies of cloud computing, there is need for a

new, more e↵ective platform. Fog computing is one platform that can be used to manage the
IoT. Fog computing is a virtualization architecture that handles fundamental distinguishing
1

services closer to the ground. Fog computing can process large amounts of data, handle
storage, and networking services, and handle real-time acquisition and location awareness
[6, 7]. Fog computing improves privacy and data security as data is stored and processed
close to end users at the base of the network, between the devices and the cloud [8, 9].

1.2

Characteristics of Fog Computing
There are many characteristics of fog computing that are making it more popular in

the field of technology, particularly in light of the IoT expansion. It is an upgrade on cloud
computing with more features that are useful for new technological challenges.
Fog computing supports cloud computing and allows analytics resources to conduct
intensive and extended term analytics [10]. Fog computing is close to the user, at the edge
of the network thus ensuring low latency and efficient services, a characteristic critical to
applications such as interactive sessions, networked games, healthcare applications, and video
streaming which require low latency and location awareness.
Another indication of the benefits of fog computing is the geographical spread and
high number of fog nodes. These are set to support moving vehicles and other mobile applications Fog computing provides a critical foundation for the new innovations in autonomous
vehicles, ensuring quality services in connected cars technologies.
Fog computing, at the edge of the cloud and geographically spread, will prove to be
beneficial in increasing bandwidth efficiency while improving data privacy. In fog computing
data is processed at the fog node which means the need to send large amounts of data to the
cloud is significantly reduced thus minimizing the consumption of bandwidth and maximizing
the privacy of data because sensitive information will not be transmitted [6, 8, 9].
2

1.3

Fog Computing in Healthcare Systems
There are numerous challenges facing worldwide healthcare systems [11, 12]. Fog

computing capabilities can help address these challenges. Inadequacies in current systems
render the use of cloud computing technology in many current healthcare applications ineffective. For instance, the transmission of data from the sensors to the cloud and from the
cloud to hospitals is slow on cloud computing. This is specifically important as healthcare
systems often require urgent on-the-fly, responses that command data processing to increase
efficiency. Slow data transmission compromises the efficiency of healthcare systems. [13].
Further healthcare data is sensitive and protected by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [14, 15] so the minimization of data transfer supports and guarantees data security. For this very reason, healthcare providers often prefer
data storage remain within the organization. This increase in efficiency for both patient and
provider is impetus for healthcare systems to adopt fog computing [16].
Fog computing is also used by some [17] to pre-process data before it is transmitted
to the cloud initiating faster response to patient needs. To take advantage of fog computing,
[18] introduced a novel hierarchical computing architecture for IoT-based patient monitoring systems targeted at the execution of machine-learning data analytics. [19] utilized fog
computing technology to collect data traces on patient movement so that patients can access
faster and more efficient services, at low latency, in the event of a medical emergency.
Fog computing is increasingly applied in the healthcare industry, attracting the attention of many healthcare technology researchers as will be discussed in Chapter 2. One of
the most important issues in both fog computing and healthcare is the preservation of data
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security and the privacy of end users of the system and patients. There are numerous studies
that strive to address the security issues of fog computing in a healthcare setting [20], but
there are still aspects of this issue that need further attention, such as assessment of data
damaged by malicious attacks and determination of a method of secure data recovery after
it has been damaged by malicious transactions.

1.4

Fog Computing in Critical Infrastructure Systems
Fog computing in smart city utilities, will enable the IoT and smart devices to pro-

cess data faster, setting up quicker decision making and saving time. This also means the
aggregation of data will be limited to the indispensable data in the cloud. The processing
of huge amounts of data is required in smart cities and many countries around the world
developing these cities, fog computing has compelling potential for the processing of. smart
meters, traffic data, city activities, and utilities data and. Efficiently processed data will accommodate sustainable living in very developed cities [21]. However, it is important to note
that it would be unrealistic to rely entirely on fog computing for processing large volumes of
data. Cloud computing will necessarily continue to be used in the e↵orts to ensure successful
smart cities.
Fog computing can be used by service providers and utility to manage and analyse
consumer data efficiently, ensuring customers access to improved services. Many research
studies exist on increasing the e↵ectiveness of fog computing in smart cities and solving
technical issues arising in the processing of volumes of data, especially those that require
integration to the cloud [22]. IoT devices like smart meters in modern smart cities will not
only generate a lot of data but the diversity of that data will have to be processed in real4

time [23]. While data in large quantity is generally very valuable, archaic technology will not
harness the full value of data collected in smart cities. The current cloud is insufficient for
handle such amount of data, especially tasks like processing the aggregate data, analysis and
storage [24] and while data security and privacy issues have been documented by researchers,
damage assessment and data recovery in the event of a cyberattack continue to require study
and innovation.

1.5

Intelligent Environment Systems (Governments as example)
Governments around the world are focusing on intelligent environmental systems

aimed at both conserving the environment and improving the lives of humans. Fog computing
makes it possible to build these systems and optimize the benefits of environmental systems
including provision of high-quality services. Still, there are risks involved in developing
intelligent environmental or government systems. Perhaps the worst of those risks are data
protection and data recovery in the event of a data breach.
In fact, one of the major concerns as regards government system data is the sensitivity of that data; any data breach could expose the country to attack from enemy states or
terrorists. [25]. Some of the sensitive data domiciled in intelligent government systems include traffic control systems, video-conference applications, and real-time surveillance camera
monitoring, and they require real-time processing and location awareness. Therefore, data
damage assessment and recovery are essential in preventing data breaches as well as building
a secure and dependable database. In a government data environment, the transmission
of crucial data is common and needs to occur in a safe system secure from intrusion. For
instance, an attack on a traffic control system or real-time surveillance camera monitor5

ing application would paralyze their vital functions like real-time processing and location
awareness. The repercussions of damaged government data systems may include destruction
of property or even loss of life and manipulation of economic systems. So, in addition to
developing appropriate mechanisms for adaptation of fog computing in intelligent systems,
developing adequate security features capable of responding to attacks by providing fast and
accurate damage assessment and recovery techniques is of cardinal importance.

1.6

Computing System Security
Securing a computing system is critical in every situation and industry. There are

three key phases required to ensure a system is protected and secure. The first phase is
data protection. Techniques like access control, encryption, auditing, and authentication are
applied to the system to secure and protect the data. The second phase is an intrusion and
compromise detection system This can be software or a device that monitors the system
with the goal of sensing any malicious activities or policy violations and raising an alarm
so that it can be addressed. The most vital component of this phase is timely detection
and notification of the system compromise [26]. This phase uses an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) which can observe system activity and alerts the person who is in charge of
any unusual activity. This requires more assistance from the third phase, which includes
damage assessment and data recovery ensuring the integrity and accessibility of the data in
the system.
The third phase is critical in detecting any further transgressions on the system and
making sure that the database has been restored and is secure. This phase can be divided
into two important stages: damage assessment and data recovery. Damage assessment is
6

the primary process in this phase and is used to identify compromised transactions and data
items. Data recovery restores the damaged data to its last consistent state before the attack.
To make this possible, log files must retain information about the changes applied to data
items by various transactions in the system [27].
Delay time is computed in the damage assessment stage from the moment the IDS
identifies a malicious transaction until all transactions or data items a↵ected by the introduction of the malicious transaction have been identified. During this time, the system will
be unavailable so, we aim to minimize the this process requires as much as possible. Time
latency for the data recovery stage is computed from the moment all a↵ected transactions
have been received until all data items have been recovered. During this time only the
a↵ected data items will be unavailable for use so as before, we aim to minimize the time
required for this process.
The system is not capable of assessing all damaged data through the damage assessment and data recovery algorithms with the use of log files on each fog node independently in
a fog computing environment. For instance, as shown in Fig. 1.1, if the Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) identifies T3 in Fog1 and T8 in Fog2 as malicious transactions and if every
involved fog node individually tests their local log files, the system will then just detect T5
and T6 as a↵ected transactions in Fog1 and T10 as an a↵ected transaction in Fog2 . However, T7 and T8 in Fog3 , dependent on the a↵ected transactions in Fog1 , and T9 in Fog2 ,
dependent on the a↵ected transactions in Fog3 , have been a↵ected and will not be detected
by these independent assessments. So to confirm that all a↵ected transactions in the system
are detected there must be collaboration between fog nodes.
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Figure 1.1: An example of the necessity
of having cooperation between fog nodes to obtain
L
accurate data damage assessment.
notation could indicate any possible operation.
1.7

Summary of Contributions
Securing any computing system is necessary for the protection and security of the

system and its data. To that end, three primary phases are essential to ensure a system
is protected and secure [27]. The first phase in data protection utilizes methods including
access control, auditing, authentication, and encryption. The second phase focuses on intrusion detection and utilizes software or a device that observes the system with the intent of
detecting any malicious activity or policy violations. If intrusion of the system occurs, the
third phase, which includes damage assessment and data recovery, ensures the integrity and
availability of system data. This third phase is essential in detecting any additional data
corruption and in ensuring the system is returned to a secure state.
The main objective of this research is to demonstrate the ability of the proposed
algorithms to detect data damaged in an attack in systems maintaining extremely sensitive databases and employing fog computing environments. Critical infrastructure systems,
smart cities, intelligent government systems, and healthcare systems are among those where
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databases store sensitive information. They are prime targets for attacks.
The first goal of this research is the construct of two models for fog computing based
on healthcare systems. The first architecture will use fog modules with heterogeneous data,
and the second will use fog modules with homogeneous data. A unique approach to damage
assessment will be proposed for each module.
Traditional damage assessment and data recovery algorithms usually delete data affected by an attack to guarantee the integrity of the database. In the proposed algorithms
the a↵ected data will be identified and retained for use in any future investigation. Suppose, for instance, a critical patient information system was attacked. A treating physician,
unaware of the data violation, administers medication to a patient with life-threatening allergies. Identifying, and retaining the original, a↵ected data has the potential to avoid further
consequences.
The second goal is to introduce a unique model that uses fog computing to manage
utility service companies and consumer data in the infrastructure systems of smart cities. A
novel technique to detect and assess data items that are a↵ected by a malignant attack will
be proposed. This proposal will generate a method for recovery of the original data and a
strategy for returning the database to a state consistent with that prior to the transgression.
The construct of a damage audit table, a structure, that will be used to collect data needed
in the recovery process, will be implemented.
The third goal of this research is to design a novel model for an intelligent government
system that will use fog computing technology to control and manage the data in the entire
system. Unique algorithms that will sustain the integrity of data in the system in the event of
a cyberattack, are proposed for this segment of the research. These algorithms are intended
9

to maintain the security of systems experiencing the execution of a malicious transaction
or modified data in the database of fog node. A transaction dependency graph will be
implemented in this model to observe and monitor all transactions and quickly detect all
a↵ected transactions if a malicious transaction is found.
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2

Literature Review

2.1

Fog Computing
The benefits of cloud computing are synonymous to its advantages especially to busi-

nesses and other related entities. One such benefit revolves around the reduction of workload
as well as the administrative burden of system maintenance and data management. Work
is made easier, cheaper, and fast with cloud computing. The need for low latency, mobility
support, and geo-distribution and location awareness must be addressed with the changing needs of database management [6]. This development pushed for the implementation
of a new infrastructure by Cisco Systems known as fog computing in 2014. Bonomi et al.
[28] advised that fog computing is just an addition or an enhancement on cloud computing technologies that are central to edge computing technologies to handle issues facing the
computing system such as high latency and inflexibility.
Fog computing as a computing infrastructure has elicited the attention of the academia
and other interests such as for industrial research [29, 30, 31, 32]. Several researchers developed architecture models for the fog system as discussed in Section [33, 34] in general survey
or study of the challenges, issues, and future direction.

2.1.1

Fog Computing Features
Fog computing has been known to advance the features of cloud computing to improve

database operations. The first feature associated with fog computing concerns location,
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which can be termed as the edge of networks. This feature enhances the quality of services
provided that are high and reduces the latency from high to low, a factor that helps save time
and system performances. Application areas include the healthcare industry through the
monitoring applications used for patients, gaming, and online streaming of videos. Mobility
is a substantial feature in fog computing that is promoted through the broad dispersion of
fog nodes, hence enhancing its geographical accessibility. An example of the applicability of
these characteristics is in moving vehicle services. This application makes fog a vital keystone
in the provision of high-quality services for associated car technologies. Fog’s feature of being
located at the edge of the cloud and its widespread geographical distribution help increase
bandwidth efficiency, privacy, and security of sensitive data. Most of the local data in a
database system are processed by fog nodes, which indicates that a reduction in the amount
of data sent to the cloud for processing will help reduce the consumption of bandwidth.
This activity ensures the maximization of privacy related to sensitive data transmission
[6, 8]. Therefore, fog computing should work as a proper, appropriate platform for numerous
sensitive Internet of Things (IoT) services and applications, which could include connected
vehicles, electricity automation systems, and smart cities.
In their study regarding the present direction of patterns for technology usage and
the development of enabling technologies, Vaquero et al. [35] proposed a comprehensive
definition of fog computing, that is, “a scenario in which a large number of heterogeneous
ubiquitous and decentralized devices communicate and there exists potential cooperation
among themselves and with the network to complete storage and processing tasks without
third party intervention. They further provided an explanation for why a subscribed communication model is required when data only requires to be sent or published. This helps
12

reduce traffic in the network, keep congestion problems at the edge of the network, and have
a positive influence on privacy protection.”
The importance of preprocessing whereby data gets changed and the movement of
data to the cloud utilizing computing technologies such as smart gateway was discussed by
Aazam et al. [17]. They devised a new infrastructure for smart gateway, which was mainly
concerned with smart homes and would enable the connection to IoT devices. They also
proposed a new architecture for a smart gateway using fog computing. Ivan et al. [36]
investigated the merits of fog computing for services in various dimensions. The services include electricity networks, IoT, CPS, and automation of buildings. They studied an updated
model for fog computing and its security issues.

2.1.2

Fog Computing Security and Privacy Issues
Cloud computing may not help resolve security and privacy issues, such as data pro-

tection, data availability, authentication, and user communication, leaving the role to fog
computing [37]. The combination of crucial data enhances privacy and security because most
of the data are processed locally at the edge of the network [38]. Security is enhanced as the
distance of the data sent is minimized, making fog computing systems advantageous. The local processing and minimization of that distance minimizes the transmission of sensitive data
over the network, hence reducing the susceptibility to eavesdropping [39]. Several security
and privacy issues can be mitigated by integrating fog computing with IoT infrastructure
[40].
However, security and privacy issues have largely contributed to the research and
contributions of novel concepts and improvement solutions [37, 41, 42]. The utilization of fog
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computing in smart grids, cities, and intelligent systems such as healthcare and government
systems to enhance the quality of services provided, and supply security and privacy to
consumers has also attracted the attention of researchers [43, 44, 45, 46, 36, 47, 48].
A fog computing architecture was mentioned in [49], in which the cloud and IoT have
to be provided with end-to-end security. Fog computing architecture relies on fog nodes
responsible for managing data and providing communication services in the system. The
fog node design should encompass functional security measures to provide reliable security
and protection, and achieve a dependable end-to-end computing infrastructure. The establishment of trusted fog nodes means that a safe network can be placed on top of the node
infrastructure. This method leads to the formation of a basis for security between one node
and another, a node to a thing, and finally the connection between a node and a cloud.
Zhu et al. proposed a scheme for enhancing privacy by using methods such as blind
signature that would ensure anonymity in the authentication processes using the set conditions in the system [44]. Billing problems in smart cities would be resolved by their recommended encryption methods to aggregate smart meter readings in the cloud. This model
has its discrepancies that subject customer data to susceptibility to insider and electronic
attacks.
Lyu et al. also addressed the element of smart cities and smart meter readings [45] by
suggesting a new framework for aggregating smart meter reading safely through fog nodes to
the cloud. The proposed framework involves the addition of statistical noise that is simply
irregularities in the data to enhance the data privacy of their clients. The specific technique
applied here is the Gaussian noise technique to enable the encryption of data and attain
customer privacy.
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Mohammed et al. [50], provided an encryption-based scheme to avert rogue fog
computing nodes and stop them from risking end-user data security while upholding reduced
time latency and communication overhead between the cloud and the fog nodes. They also
proposed a blockchain-encryption-based scheme integrating the CP-ABE algorithm with
blockchain technology for the detection of rogue fog nodes federated with other fog nodes.
When rogue fog nodes are detected, they are ousted, making them incapable of accessing
data encrypted with the fog federation’s attributes; data stored in fog nodes in the same
federation or in the cloud are made safe from the rogue. They also relied on blockchain
technology to perform authorization in a distributed manner and track the encrypted data
through fog federations [51].

2.1.3

Fog Computing Architecture in Critical Infrastructure and Intelligent
System
Fog computing has been widely applied in the healthcare industry, which has attracted

the attention of numerous researchers [11, 18]. Azimi et al.[18] presented a new hierarchical
computing architecture of monitoring systems for patients based on IoT to benefit from
fog and cloud computing by facilitating the partitioning and executing machine learning
data analytics. A gateway, which acts as a bridging point between the sensor infrastructure
network and the Internet, is needed for the IoT-based healthcare systems to work e↵ectively
according to Amir et al. [19]. To achieve all these, sensor nodes have been utilized to collect
data traces on patient movement, utilizing body area networks that are transferred using fog
gateways that help provide quick services in medical emergency situations at low latency.
Akrivopoulos et al. [11] designed a smart-phone-based application that would help
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gather ECG signals from the patient, where the smartphone would act as a fog node. In this
case, the patient has maximal control over his health data and can distribute the information
to his doctors for health status monitoring purposes. Vora et al. [52] devised a new structure
of using fog computing to monitor patients for ambient assisted living.
Vijayakumar et al. [53] described the use of fog computing in the detection and prevention of diseases such as mosquito-borne illnesses. This application was achieved through
smart wearable devices or sensors that collect information that are later analyzed and shared
through fog computing. Vijayakumar et al. recommended a fog-based health monitoring and
risk assessment system that can be applied to di↵erentiate mosquito-borne diseases and create alerts whenever an emergency arises. This system comprises a cyber space, where data
processing is undertaken, and a physical space, which contains the user’s information and
environmental factors.
Smart cities and grids have been encompassed and have relied on fog computing to
be adopted e↵ectively. Naranjo et al. [54] devised a new architecture for the utilization
of fog computing in smart cities. The recommended architecture can run the applications
on IoT devices jointly for functions such as computing, routing, and communicating with
one another through the smart city environment. This architecture decreases latency, and
improves the provision of energy and the efficiency of services among things with diverse
capabilities.
Tang et al. [55] also made provisions that smart cities would require a new computing paradigm to drive IoT services and applications. They recommended a hierarchical
distributed fog computing architecture to allow or support the incorporation of numerous
infrastructure constituents and services in forthcoming smart cities.
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To advance the smart city concept, Amaxilatis et al. [56] developed an application for
smart water metering that would supply data in real time such as consumption on demand
as well as bidirectional to end users from metering devices. This application enhances the
infrastructure in the concept of smart cities through fog computing.
Aazam et al. [46] discussed the architecture of industrial IoT, which can be described
as the use of the IoT in the manufacturing industry for applications such as smart sensors,
actuators, and robots. Finally, smart homes have been on the rise according to Froiz et
al. [57] owing to technological advancements such as fog computing, which assists in the
development of IoT applications. Technologies such as WiFi and ZigBee need to be used
for these smart homes to communicate with IoT nodes as well as the cloud. Fog computing
must be a solution that provides essential support closer to the end users to ensure local,
real-time processing for sensitive, complex tasks.
A distributed fog computing architecture coordinator was proposed in [58] for IoT
applications in the smart grid. The key objective of this fog computing coordinator is to
occasionally collect information of fog computing nodes, such as information on the remaining
resources and tasks. Job management is also achieved through the fog computing coordinator
such that all computing nodes can work together on complex tasks. A programming model
for fog- based architecture was also proposed. The introduction of fog node coordination
is the major di↵erence between their proposed architecture and the traditional one. Fog
node coordination aims to enhance the collaboration among fog nodes to meet di↵erent
requirements in the smart grid.
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2.2

Database Security
A computing system needs to be secured to guarantee the protection and security of

the system and its data. Database security does not only comprise the technical aspects but
also moral and ethical as well as legal issues, in which specific laws exist to help regulate
information disclosure according to Pernul [59]. The three principles of database security can
be described as secrecy, integrity, and availability of stored data. To achieve this objective,
three primary phases are essential to ensure that a system is protected and secure [27].
The first phase applied in the protection of data relies on methods such as access control,
auditing, authentication, and encryption. This first phase involves data that are at rest
and not moving. Security is provided for such data including limiting access at entry and
endpoints. Access control of data also involves password management or classification of
sensitive data.
The second phase relevant to the protection of data emphasizes the detection of
intrusion and relies on devices that assess the system to detect any malicious activity or
policy violations. Forms of intrusion include misuse of authority such as theft of media
or modification of data, logical inference and aggregation that concerns the sensitivity of
data, masquerade that involves unauthorized access by an intruder masquerading to be an
authorized user, or even bypassing of controls such as passwords, browsing, or through Trojan
horses according to Pernul [59]. This second phase involves data that are in transit. In this
phase, the security of the system borders as well the monitoring of the movement of data
and identifying threats are ensured.
In the case of system intrusion, the third phase, which includes damage assessment
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and data recovery, safeguards the integrity and availability of the system data. This third
stage is critical in the detection of any additional data corruption and ensuring that the
system reverts to a secure state. This phase involves data that are already being utilized.
Detection encompasses user monitoring for those who have access to sensitive data.
This research objectively demonstrates the ability of the proposed algorithms in the
detection of system data that are damaged in an attack while maintaining very sensitive
databases and applying fog computing environments. Critical infrastructure systems, smart
cities, intelligent government systems, and healthcare systems are vulnerable to attacks
because of the sensitivity of the information stored in their databases.

2.2.1

Damage Assessment and Data Recovery
Research has studied damage assessment and data recovery in traditional databases.

Models and mechanisms for data recovery following cyberattacks have been proposed [60,
61, 62, 63, 64]. However, academic contribution to damage assessment and data recovery in
modern database infrastructure, such as fog and edge computing, appears lacking. Damage
is usually caused by elements such as computer viruses, Trojan horses, logic bombs, or trap
doors. Recovery can be termed as rolling back of transactions to revert the database to its
previous normal state. This approach should be undertaken immediately after databases
are a↵ected to reduce denial of service as well as ensure the accuracy of the algorithms on
databases in question. Kaddoura et al. [65] recommended the use of a single matrix for
damage assessment and recovery of algorithms. Other techniques such as parsing of the
database log to check for the a↵ected transactions were recommended by [66]. Damage
assessment usually takes place after the set preventive measures fail to prevent malicious
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attacks. Malicious attacks generally intend to damage data stored on the database system.
Damage can occur to the whole system of specific objects that are difficult to detect according
to Liu at el. [67].
Panda at el. [60] recommended the data dependency method instead of transaction
dependency. Every read and write operation of a transaction must be classified into one of
five di↵erent types grounded on the data dependency between each operation. A directed
graph, whose function is characterized by o↵ering up data items that have been a↵ected in
the database, is utilized.
The column dependency-based approach presented by Chakraborty et al. [68] deduces
the relationship between transactions to determine which transactions a↵ected by malicious
attacks need to be recovered. In this approach, the recovery of data after attacks, which
is usually time consuming, takes less time than traditional approaches. Chakraborty et
al. suggested a recovery method that would take the a↵ected transactions as input and
implement the recovery in two stages: compensation and re-execution. They deduced from
their experiments that when malicious transactions increase in the database, the second
stage of their recovery scheme also increases.
Liu and Yu [67] intended to advance the efficiency of damage assessment and repair in
distributed database systems. First, they identified the challenges and complications faced
by those systems. Then, they proposed an algorithm for distributed damage assessment and
repair. A local damage assessment and recovery (DAR) was adopted on each site. Later, they
adopted an Executor to scan the local log to detect and clean any sub transaction a↵ected
by a malicious transaction. Additionally, a local DAR Manager on each site cooperates with
the Executor to guarantee global coordination between all sites on the system through the
20

generation of a coordinator for any cleaning transaction.
Panda et al. [69] used the data dependency-based approach to assess the damage that
could occur from electronic attacks and then return the database to a consistent state. They
introduced two algorithms. In the first one, damage assessment and recovery algorithms are
e↵ected simultaneously, resulting in considerable delays due to blocking the system until the
whole procedure is complete. The second algorithm handles this because the system will
be soon available after all the a↵ected and damaged data are identified and blocked. Fu et
al. [61] introduced new dependencies that relied on analyzing inter transaction dependency
relationships to resolve damage assessment. They proposed and evaluated four di↵erent
dependency relationships between transactions that could transfer the damage.
Ammann et al. [66] also introduced algorithm sets and recommended a mechanism
that would only work on the damaged portions of the database to restore the log files
immediately when proposed damage is assessed and perform data recovery algorithms. These
algorithms can only operate while the database is available during repair, but the database
must be unavailable during repair especially when the initial algorithm is performing. This
approach also o↵ers o✏ine analysis of databases and how the process provides data for the
repair of damaged transactions.
In [63], approaches were o↵ered by the authors for data recovery that is maliciously
attacked through the addition of Before-Image Tables (BI Tables). These BI Tables cannot
be modified by any user at any point or time and have values of all deleted and updated
data items. The old value from the BI Tables is rolled back whenever the system detects
an update to a data item made by a malicious attacker. They claimed that this approach
can trace the data as they spread through di↵erent machines. The BI Tables are utilized to
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repair the damaged data without even assessing the log file.
Zuo and Panda [70] consequently introduced two dissimilar methods for the detection
of a↵ected transactions in the distributed database system. The first method utilized the
peer-to-peer model, which is much useful when assessing a single point of failure, rather
than multiple failure points in the system. The second method is a centralized model whose
efficiency is high in the case of a large-scale distributed database system as a result of the
minimization of network communications among the sites.
Haraty et al. [65] proposed an algorithm that would track transactions that read
from one another and then keep this information in a single matrix. The advantage of this
approach is that time is not wasted, and recovery is fast, unlike the traditional methods that
would roll back all transactions up to the end. The use of a single 2D matrix helps store
dependencies between transactions by identifying the a↵ected segment of the database.
Additionally, Sobhan and Panda [71] recommended a new logging protocol that
records all the necessary information for the full repair of a database that is updated by
committed but a↵ected transactions. Lala and Panda [72] devised a damage assessment
model as well as four associated data structures to hasten accurate data recovery. These rely
on dependency relationships among the transactions, which in turn update the database.
Similar sentiments or recommendations were echoed by Panda and Zhou [73] to devise accurate, fast methods for damage assessment. Two approaches, which include the use of
transaction dependency relationships to determine the a↵ected transactions, were recommended in the attacked database. The other second approach considers data dependency
relationships to identify the data items a↵ected by the attack for future use in terms of
recovery.
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The most targeted sites for attacks are those that contain sensitive information such
as E-government sites. In the case of a malicious attacks, such sites require fast damage
assessment as well as recovery of data. Kurra et al. [74] recommended a model that could
advance damage assessment and recovery through minimal log access using multiple agents,
which helps save time.
Rao and Patel in [62] introduced a methodology for data recovery based on the
inclusion of application specific metadata to form transaction dependencies. For the best
performance, a column-based transaction dependency is used in this method. Their model
restores only a↵ected transactions and skips malicious transactions and valid transactions.

2.2.2

Data Dependency versus Transaction Dependency
A collection of operations or tasks, such as reading and writing, can be termed as

a transaction. Every operation has limits, such as minimum processing units that cannot
be further divided. Whenever a data item is written by a transaction, it is possible for it
to be read by another transaction. This situation creates a dependency between those two
transactions. For example, transaction Tx reads data item D1 and then writes data item
D2 . Similarly, Ty reads item D2 , making transaction Ty dependent on Tx . Owing to this
form of dependency, if Tx becomes a↵ected by a malicious attack, Ty will also be a↵ected.
Thus, in a fog computing environment, a data item that is informed by any transaction in a
fog node can be read by any other.
Therefore, damage assessment relies on either data dependency or transaction dependency. Data dependency assesses if data items in the database are written after reading
data items that are a↵ected by an intrusion. By contrast, transaction dependency situates
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a transaction that is most likely to be a↵ected if a data item that is to be read is written by
a malicious of an a↵ected transaction according to Haraty et al. [65]. In the study of Panda
and Yalamanchili [75], transaction dependency focuses on malicious transactions for system
recovery. Transactions a↵ected by malicious transactions are also placed in line for recovery.
These transactions that are malicious of those that are dependent on them are usually undone. Others that are a↵ected by malicious transactions are redone. Untouched transactions
have nothing done to them because they are neither dependent on malicious transactions
nor a↵ected by them. Transaction dependency is a self-healing system according to Xia et
al. [76]. Consequently, data dependency has all the data items a↵ected by malicious transactions returned to their previous state that could be the values of the data. Therefore, data
dependency methods for database recovery undo and redo the a↵ected operations or rather
transactions, and do not undo all the transactions according to Zheng [77].

2.2.3

Flushing the Data
Fog computing is known to have storage limitations, and this calls for the periodic

flushing and removal of data and corresponding log files of fog nodes and their permanent
storage in the cloud [29, 78]. Each fog node, therefore, will have efficient and automated
access to its own cloud space. In specific cases, further assessment of the flushed data needs
to be undertaken using the proposed algorithm. However, assumptions are made that this
action will be executed at optimal intervals when the proposed approach has been launched
and all a↵ected transactions detected or the IDS has provided clearance to the flushed data.
The advantages of this [29] are its capability to enhance the runtime efficiency of
the proposed algorithm because the size of the fog database used in our approach is likely
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to be diminished. Another advantage is the improved efficacy in detecting a↵ected transactions among all data that is flushed to the cloud because all the data will be in one
high-performance machine. Flushing is, however, meant to be performed when the database
is in a secure state and the commitment of all transaction is complete.
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3

Ensuring Data Integrity in Fog Computing Based Healthcare Systems

Model
Some of the following paragraphs, figures, and algorithms that will be introduced in
this chapter have been already published in our work [43] as shown in the publications and
reprint permissions chapter 7.

3.1

Introduction
The future of the internet will be in the Internet of things (IoT), which is evidenced

by the significant increase in wearable technology, smart homes and buildings, connected
vehicles, and smart grids. The estimated number of connected IoT devices in 2030 is nearly
125 billion, which will produce an enormous amount of data [3]. Due to the limitation and
restriction of bandwidth, as well as the rapid growth in the amount of data produced, the
current information system architecture will be inadequate for managing and moving that
volume of data to the cloud. In many scenarios, it could be impractical to do so, especially
with the increasing number of IoT devices in use. Additionally, our current society has
incorporated a lot of sensitive and real-time applications of IoT as integral parts of our lives
for instance, through the use of connected car technologies, video conference applications,
health monitoring, and real-time production line monitoring, all applications requiring lowlatency and location awareness in order to provide satiable and high-quality services [4].
The need for a new platform will become necessary to address the above-mentioned
issues. For that purpose, fog computing, introduced by Cisco, is a virtualization architec-
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ture that provides many fundamental distinguishing services close to the ground, including
the ability to process copious amounts of data, storage, and networking services, making
fog computing especially appropriate for many sensitive applications that require real-time
acquisition and location awareness [6]. It enhances privacy and security because the data is
kept and computed close to end users at the edge of the network, between the end devices
and a cloud [8].
Fog computing has several unique characteristics that will not only establish it as an
extension of the cloud, but will also provide extra privileges over the cloud. The first feature
is its location at the edge of networks, providing end users with high-quality services and low
latency. Many current applications require location awareness and low latency to provide
a higher quality of services and performances, such as healthcare applications, networked
games, video streaming, and interactive sessions. Another essential characteristic is the
widely dispersed and significant numbers of fog nodes that will be geographically available,
a design that supports mobility in many applications, including service in moving vehicles.
This will make fog an important cornerstone of providing high-quality services for connected
car technologies. Both fog’s location at the edge of the cloud and its geographically widespread distribution will also contribute to the benefits of increasing bandwidth efficiency
and enhancing the privacy and security of sensitive data. Most of the data will be processed
locally at the fog node, meaning that the amount of data needing to be sent to the cloud for
processing will be diminished, helping to minimize bandwidth consumption and maximize
the privacy of transmitting sensitive data [6, 8].
The healthcare system faces several challenges [11, 12] that some features of fog
computing mentioned above may be able to solve. Therefore, the healthcare system can
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capitalize on fog computing to create better experiences and services for both patients and
providers. One of the most crucial issues in both the fields of fog computing and healthcare
is preserving the security and privacy of consumer or patient data. While several studies
have sought to solve the security issues of fog computing in a healthcare environment [20],
there are still aspects of this issue that should be given further attention, such as assessment
of the damage data could su↵er from malicious attacks and determination of how to securely
recover data from malicious transactions. Damage assessment and data recovery are essential
in creating secure and reliable databases, particularly for the transmission of sensitive data,
such as that of the healthcare environment. For example, if an intrusion detection system
(IDS) detects malicious transactions in the system, any other transactions that read this data
will also be a↵ected, resulting in any doctor’s decision made based on a↵ected transactions,
potentially putting a patient in danger of harm. To the best of our knowledge, there has
been no previous work done on the development of damage assessment and data recovery
methods for fog computing systems. We present two models for using fog computing systems
that manage healthcare data: architecture using fog modules with heterogeneous data, and
a second architecture using fog modules with homogeneous data, using unique approaches
for each module for assessing the damage caused by malicious transactions, for accurately
recovering data, and for identifying a↵ected transactions for future investigation.

3.2

The Models
In this section, we introduce two possible architectures for using fog computing to

manage healthcare data. For each architecture, we propose suitable algorithms to determine
the e↵ect of an attack on the system and identify data damaged either directly or indirectly
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so that they can be recovered quickly. We assume in both cases that the intrusion detection
system (IDS) is responsible for detecting the malicious transactions in the system and will
provide a list of these transactions. In addition, each fog node in both architectures must
have its own log file. Both architectures proposed here also use a strict serializable history,
and the log files cannot be modified by users at any time.

3.3

Model Notations
Table 3.1 shows the description of notation to be used in our proposed approaches.
Table 3.1: Notation used in our proposed approaches description.
Notation
FDR
FM

MT L
A↵ Lfdr
A↵ Lfdrj
A↵ Lfmj
A↵ Lfdrcloud
A↵ Lfdrcloud,j
A↵ Lcloud,j

Description
The main fog node, which is accessed by the health care
providers to read and write about the patients.
Fog node for specific monitors used to collect the data from
the patients using the IoT devices, e.g. Fog of Heart Monitors.
List of detected malicious transactions done by IDS.
List of all a↵ected transactions that have been detected in
FDR.
List of all a↵ected transactions that have been read by FDR
from FMj .
List of all a↵ected transactions that are detected by the
proposed algorithm in the fog node FMj .
List of all a↵ected transactions that done by cloud over the
flushed data of FDR fog node.
List of all a↵ected transactions that done by cloud over the
flushed data of fog node j and have been read by FDR node.
List of all a↵ected transactions that done by cloud over the
flushed data of fog node j.
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3.4

The First Proposed Architecture: Fog Nodes with Homogeneous Data
In this model, data will be written to one fog node, which can be read by multiple

fog nodes. The patient data will be collected using end-users and Internet of things (IoT)
devices, such as sensors, and sent to the proper fog node, which we call fog monitors (FM).
For example, information about a patient’s heart rate will be sent to the Fog of Heart
Monitors, and his or her blood pressure reading will be sent to the fog of blood pressure
monitors. Therefore, each fog node FM will contain only homogeneous data.
Additionally, in this model there is a main fog node, known as the Fog for Doctor
Reports (FDR), which has access to read any necessary data from the other fog nodes (FMs).
Healthcare providers, however, will only have access to the main node. When a doctor wants
to check patient records, he or she must read the patient’s data from the FDR and write
reports, concerns, and prescriptions based on that data, as shown in Fig. 3.1. We assume
that each fog node will have the ability to perform some basic operations with the data, such
as calculating a patient’s average body temperature over a certain time frame or aggregating
the totals of selected data values.

3.4.1

Damage Assessment Algorithm for the First Model.
Once the IDS detects all malicious transactions in the system, it will send to each

fog node a list of malicious transactions that have been detected on it. Let us say that a
malicious transaction Ti has been detected by the IDS on Fog1 . Fog1 will then perform the
following procedures:
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Figure 3.1: First proposed architecture “fog nodes with homogeneous data”.

3.4.1.1

First procedure:

Fog1 will check its local log to confirm whether Ti is still in its local database (DB).
• If Ti is not in the DB, it has been flushed to the permanent storage in the cloud.
In this case, the list of malicious transactions will be forwarded to the cloud to identify
all a↵ected transactions by checking data received from all fog nodes. (This step will
be more e↵ective and efficient via cloud computing, since all data is now in one highperformance machine that saves time by reducing unnecessary communication between
the fog nodes.) After the cloud receives those lists, it will scan the flushed logs to
identify any a↵ected transaction that is dependent on any of the damaged transactions
from the list.
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Once the cloud finishes the damage assessment procedure and identifies all a↵ected
transactions, it will create a list of a↵ected transactions A↵ Lcloud,j for each fog node
in the system which has a↵ected transaction in its flushed data. The A↵ Lcloud,j lists
will be sent to their corresponding fog nodes to be used as input for our proposed
algorithms to do further detection. The cloud will identify all a↵ected transactions
read by the FDR, since the FDR log file is flushed to the cloud along with the data.
• If Ti is still in the local DB of Fog1 , then the second procedure will be performed, as
outlined below, to detect any additional a↵ected transactions.

3.4.1.2

Second procedure:

Three algorithms will be launched once the fog receives the list of malicious transactions MT L, detected by the IDS, or A↵ Lcloud,j that is sent from the cloud. The first
algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, allows FM fog nodes to further detect all damaged transactions
and mark them as a↵ected. This algorithm will also confirm whether the main fog node
(FDR) has read any of these identified transactions. If so, the algorithm will send a list
A↵ Lfdrj to the FDR to use as input for further detection. The other two algorithms,
Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3, are for the main fog node FDR. The Algorithm 3.2 could run simultaneously with Algorithm 3.1 once MT L, A↵ Lfdrcloud ,or A↵ Lfdrcloud,j list is received,
to ensure fast detection of all a↵ected transactions. The FDR fog node will not launch
Algorithm 3.3 until any list of a↵ected transactions from the FM fog nodes is received.
To illustrate the first model, suppose the IDS system detects Ti , Alice’s body temperature, as a malicious transaction that is collected by the end user Sj1 . Sj1 is connected
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Algorithm 3.1 FM Fog Nodes Assessment Algorithm
Input:
• List of detected malicious transactions MT L done by IDS, or A↵ Lcloud,j list from
the cloud.
• The local FM log file.

Output:

• List of all a↵ected transactions A↵ Lfmj that will be detected by our proposed
algorithm in the Fog node FMj .
• A↵ Lfdrj List of all a↵ected transactions that have been read by FDR.

The Algorithm:
1: Creates a new a↵ected-transactions list A↵ Lfmj and initializes to null where j is the
current fog node ID.
2: Creates a new a↵ected list A↵ Lfdrj and initializes to null.
3: Takes MT L / A↵ Lcloud,j as input
4: Copies all malicious / a↵ected transactions Ti that exist in FMj from MT L / A↵ Lcloud,j
list to A↵ Lfmj list
5: if A↵ Lfmj 6= ; then
6: Scan the local log and
7: for every Tk 2 FMj that is dependent on any Ti 2 A↵ Lfmj do
8:
Mark TK as a↵ected transaction
9:
Add TK to the A↵ Lfmj list
10: end for
11: for every Ti 2 A↵ Lfmj do
12:
Check if Ti has been read by FDR
13:
Add Ti to the A↵ Lfdrj list
14: end for
15: end if
16: Send A↵ Lfdrj to FDR to do further detection
17: Send A↵ Lfmj for data recovery.
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Algorithm 3.2 FDR Fog Node Assessment Algorithm ”1”
Input:
• List of detected malicious transactions MT L, A↵ Lfdrcloud,j , or A↵ Lfdrcloud .
• The local FDR log file.

Output:

• List of all a↵ected transactions A↵ Lfdr.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

The Algorithm:
Creates a new a↵ected-transactions list A↵ Lfdr and initializes to null
Takes MT L / A↵ Lfdrcloud,j / A↵ Lfdrcloud as input
Copies all malicious / a↵ected transactions Ti that exist in FDR from the input list to
A↵ Lfdr list
if A↵ Lfdr 6= ; then
Scan the local log and
for every Tk 2 FDR that is dependent on any Ti 2 A↵ Lfdr do
Mark TK as a↵ected transaction
Add TK to the A↵ Lfdr list
end for
end if
Send A↵ Lfdr for data recovery.

Algorithm 3.3 FDR Fog Node Assessment Algorithm ”2”
Input:
• A↵ Lfdrj list of a↵ected transactions received from other fog node FMj .
• The local FDR log file.

Output:

• List of all a↵ected transactions A↵ Lfdr.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

The Algorithm:
for each a new a↵ected list that is received from FMj do
Creates a new a↵ected-transactions list A↵ Lfdr and initializes to null
Takes A↵ Lfdrj as input
if A↵ Lfdrj 6= ; then
Scan the local log and
for every Tk 2 FDR that is dependent on any Ti 2 A↵ Lfdrj do
Mark TK as a↵ected transaction
Add TK to both list the A↵ Lfdr and A↵ Lfdrj
end for there is no a↵ected transaction has been read from FMj
end if
Send A↵ Lfdr for data recovery.
end for
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to the fog node (FMj ). Now assume that FMj has performed some local operations on its
data before the detection, as a matter of general routine, including Ti , such as:
1. Aggregate all the patients’ body temperature readings over a certain time Tagg,j
2. Calculate Alice’s average body temperature Tavg,j over the last six hours.
If FDR reads Ti , Tagg,j , and Tavg,j from FMj , then any transaction Tj 2 FDR that
is dependent on Ti , Tagg,j , or Tavg,j will be a↵ected. Note that there is no way FDR can
know that Tagg,j and Tavg,j are dependent on Ti , since they were calculated locally on the
FMj node. Therefore, any transactions that belong to FDR and are dependent on Tagg,j or
Tavg,j will not be detected by FDR itself until FDR gets a list of all a↵ected transactions
from FMj . Assume, for the following transactions T1j , T2j , and T3j 2 FDR, that:
• T1j is the doctor’s report, that is dependent on the malicious transaction Ti ;
• T2j is dependent on Tagg,j to do any kind of study or to make a budget of the hospital;
• T3j , the prescription given to Alice, is dependent on Tavg,j and has some side e↵ects
that may a↵ect other data, such as heart rate or blood pressure.
Now suppose the IDS has already detected all malicious transactions including Ti and sent
them as list MT L to the system. Then the first procedure will check each malicious transaction on MT L to determine whether it has been flushed to the cloud. Suppose, however,
that Ti is still on the local DB of FMj . In that case, the second procedure will pursue further
detection.
Thus, the FDR will run Algorithm 3.2 while all other a↵ected fog nodes FMj run
Algorithm 3.1 simultaneously. As Algorithm 3.1 runs, each a↵ected FM fog node will create
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two lists:
• A↵ Lfmj will get a copy of all malicious transactions that exist in FMj from MT L
list. All detected damage transactions in FMj will be added to this list.
• A↵ Lfdrj which will contain all a↵ected transactions read by FDR and detected by
Algorithm 3.1 in FMj .
In lines 6 - 10, the algorithm will go through every transaction in the log of FMj
to confirm whether any of them are dependent on malicious or a↵ected transactions from
the list A↵ Lfmj . If so, these transactions will also be marked as a↵ected and added to
A↵ Lfmj . Thus, Tagg,j and Tavg,j will be added to A↵ Lfmj , since they are both dependent
on the malicious transaction Ti .
In lines 11 - 14, this loop of algorithm is to check only the final A↵ Lfmj list of all
malicious and a↵ected transactions and confirm whether any have been read by FDR. If so,
these will be added to A↵ Lfdrj . Therefore, Ti , Tagg,j , and Tavg,j will be added to A↵ Lfdrj ,
since they have been read by FDR. A↵ Lfdrj will then be sent to FDR to use as input for
Algorithm 3.3 to do further detection, while A↵ Lfmj will be sent for data recovery.
Once Algorithm 3.3 receives A↵ Lfdrj , it will create a new a↵ected list, A↵ Lfdr.
The algorithm will go through all transactions in the FDR log to determine whether any
depend on the malicious or a↵ected transactions from A↵ Lfdrj . If so, these will be marked
as a↵ected transactions and added to both A↵ Lfdr and A↵ Lfdrj . T1j , T2j , and T3j will
thus be detected by the end of this loop, and all three will be added to both lists. Then
A↵ Lfdr will be sent for data recovery.
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3.5

The Second Proposed Architecture: Fog Nodes with Heterogeneous Data
In this model, we assume that all fog nodes have the same capability as well as the

ability to perform basic operations on data. However, in the “fog nodes with heterogeneous
data” model, there is no main fog node; each hospital department will have its own fog node.
Thus, when a patient is moved from one department to another, his or her data will also be
moved to the fog node of that department, as shown in Fig. 3.2. The healthcare providers in
each department will have only access to patient data through their own fog node and will
write records or reports based on this information. All patients’ data will be collected using
end users and IoT devices, such as sensors, and will be sent to the local fog node FM in the
same department.
This model can be applied outside of hospitals as well, since patient data in smart
cities will likewise move from one fog node to another while patients are traveling. Write operations can also be accessed from all nodes. Thus, unlike the “fog nodes with homogeneous
data” model, malicious transactions in the “fog nodes with heterogeneous data” model could
spread quickly and cause severe data damage. In order to resolve this issue, the fog nodes
need to cooperate with each other.

3.5.1

Damage Assessment Algorithm for the Second Model.

3.5.1.1

First procedure:

As in the first model, when malicious transactions are detected by the IDS, the affected fog node will scan for the presence of that transaction in its local DB. If the transaction
is not there, that means it has been flushed to the cloud. The full procedure in such a case
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Figure 3.2: Second proposed architecture “fog nodes with heterogeneous data”

is similar to that explained in section 3.4.1.1.

3.5.1.2

Second procedure:

Our proposed Algorithm 3.4 will be performed in case one of following list is received:
• The list of malicious transactions MT L.
• The list of a↵ected transactions from another Fog node A↵ Lfmxj .
• The list of a↵ected transactions that has been detected by cloud in the flushed data
A↵ Lcloud,j that might damage another transaction still residing in the local DB.
To illustrate the proposed algorithm for the second model, consider the following
example: Suppose that Bob has just arrived at the emergency room with a medical issue.
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Algorithm 3.4 Damage Assessment Algorithm for the Second Model
Input:
• Malicious transactions list MT L, A↵ Lfmxj from another fog, or A↵ Lcloud, j.
• The local log file.

Output:

• List of all a↵ected transactions A↵ Lfmj .

• Sub-lists of a↵ected transactions for each FMx that has been read any damaged
data from FMj .

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

The Algorithm:
Once FMj receives any of the input list
Creates a new a↵ected list A↵ Lfmj and initializes to null where j is the current fog node
ID.
Copy all malicious / a↵ected transactions Ti that exist in FMj from the received list to
A↵ Lfmj list
Scan the local log and
for every Tk 2 FMj that is dependent on any Ti 2 A↵ Lfmj do
Mark TK as a↵ected transaction
Add TK to the A↵ Lfmj list
end for
for every Ti 2 A↵ Lfmj do
if Ti has been read by any other FMX then
Check If A↵ LfmjX list does not exist, Then
Creates a new a↵ected list A↵ LfmjX and initialize to null where x is the id of aimed
Fog node that reads the a↵ected transaction.
Add Ti to the A↵ Lfmjx list
end if
end for
Send A↵ LfmjX to proper FMx to do further detection
Send A↵ Lfmj for data recovery.

All of Bob’s data will thus be sent to the Fog of the Emergency Room (FogER ). A few hours
later, however, the doctors decided to move Bob to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) because
his heart rate was not steady according to sensor S1 (call this transaction T1 ). Bob’s data
will then also be moved to the Fog for the Intensive Care Unit (FogICU ). While Bob was
in the ER, the physicians performed their tests and wrote report (T2 ) and, based on that
report, the nurses gave Bob some antiarrhythmic medication (T3 ) to stabilize his heart rate.
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Thus, transaction T2 is dependent on transaction T1 , and T3 is dependent on T2 . Suppose,
also, that medication T3 has some side e↵ects, such as abdominal pain (T4 ), hemoptysis
(T5 ), or hypoglycemia (T6 ). These three transactions should be taken into account.(This is
an example of why a↵ected and damaged transactions should not be deleted, but instead
kept and marked as a↵ected). Once Bob arrives in the ICU, he develops a reaction to the
antiarrhythmic medication T3 . The critical care specialist, based on the data and reports T1 ,
T2 , and T3 from the ER, decides to give Bob alternative antiarrhythmic medication TICU 1 .
Subsequently, the critical care specialist realizes that Bob has no heart issue and his
heart rate is normal. In the meantime, however, the IDS has notified the FogER that T1 is
a malicious transaction. There is then no way for FogICU to detect T2 and T3 as a↵ected
transactions, since they depend on T1 and they are done locally at FogER . Nevertheless,
FogER will be the only fog node in the entire system that can detect T2 and T3 . Thus, when
FogER receives the malicious transaction list including T1 , the model’s first procedure will
confirm whether T1 has been flushed to the cloud. Suppose that T1 is still in the local DB
and has not been flushed yet. FogER will then launch Algorithm 3.4, as described in the
second procedure. The first line of the algorithm will create the A↵ LFMER list to identify
all a↵ected transactions in the FogER . T1 will be copied to this list, since it still resides in the
local DB. Next, lines 3 - 7 will scan the log file, starting from T1 , and check each transaction
sharing data dependency with T1 or with any other transactions in the list. The algorithm
will find T2 in this way, mark it as an a↵ected transaction, and add it to A↵ LFMER .
When the algorithm examines the next transaction in the log for data dependency with any
a↵ected transactions from A↵ LFMER , it will now take T2 into consideration because T2
has just been added to the list. Thus, T3 will be detected, marked as a↵ected, and added to
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A↵ LFMER .
After all transactions in the log file have been scanned and examined, lines 8 - 12
of Algorithm 3.4 will confirm whether each a↵ected transaction has been read by another
fog node (to which it was moved when the patient was moved). If so, a sub-list of a↵ected
transactions will be created for each a↵ected fog node, and add to the list the a↵ected
transaction that has been read. In our example, transactions T1 , T2 , and T3 have been
moved to FogICU , so FogER will create a new sub-list A↵ LFMERICU and add T1 , T2 , and
T3 to that sub-list. Finally, A↵ LFMERICU will be sent to the FogICU for further detection,
and the main a↵ected list A↵ LFMER will be sent for data recovery. Once FogICU receives
A↵ LFMERICU , it will use the list as input in the same algorithm, and TICU 1 will be
detected as an a↵ected transaction, since there is data dependency between TICU 1 and the
a↵ected transactions T1 , T2 , and T3 . The process continues until all a↵ected transactions
are detected.

3.6
3.6.1

Experiments and Evaluation
Setup and Introduction
In the experiments, a personal computer with 16 gigabytes of RAM and a Dual-Core

Intel Core i7 processor with a speed of 3.1 GHz was used. The whole system environment was
simulated using Java to prove the model and algorithms’ applicability and efficiency. The
quality of the proposed algorithms was evaluated by performing experiments considering
di↵erent factors, including the number of transactions in each log file and the number of
attacking transactions and fog nodes in the system. The communication delay between fog
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nodes in the experiments was ignored since we used a local personal computer.
For the first model, we implemented di↵erent factors in order to draw a comparison
between the two proposed models: the fog model using heterogeneous data, and the fog model
using homogeneous data. We calculated the total time required, from initial detection of
malicious transactions by the (IDS), to assess and detect all a↵ected transactions in the
system. Furthermore, we recommended the model most suitable, or proper, considering
circumstance and other factors, for use in the healthcare system or a similar environment .
For the second and third models we simulated two primary systems. The first system
represents distribution by private, trusted fog nodes. The second simulated system represents distribution by public, non-trusted fog nodes. Then we applied our proposed damage
assessment and data recovery schemes, with minor modification, to both so that we might
study the di↵erences between them. Our goal is to show which model is more efficient, again
considering circumstance and other factors, for use with each scheme.
The factors we used for all models are as follow:
1. Number of transactions in each log files:
• 100 transactions
• 500 transactions
• 1000 transactions
2. Set of a↵ected transactions in the whole system:
• Less than 5 a↵ected transactions.
• 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions.
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• 30 to 35 a↵ected transactions.
3. The number of fog nodes in each model
• 5 fog nodes.
• 10 fog nodes.
• 15 fog nodes.
• 20 fog nodes.
3.6.2

Simulation
We simulated the whole environment for each proposed model to prove the applica-

bility and efficiency of our models and algorithms. Then we evaluated the quality of the
proposed algorithms by experimenting with di↵erent factors such as number of transactions
in each log file, the number of a↵ected transactions in the whole system, and the number of
fog nodes in the system. We sought answers to the following:
• How efficient are the proposed damage assessments algorithms to detect all a↵ected
transactions and data items in the systems.
• Compute the total time for each proposed damage assessment algorithm once the
malicious transactions list has been received until all a↵ected transactions have been
identified. During this time the system will be unavailable so, we aim to minimize this
time as much as possible.
• How efficient are the proposed data recovery algorithms to return the damaged data
to consistent state.
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• Compute time latency for each proposed data recovery algorithm from the a↵ected
transactions list has been received until the whole data items have been recovered.
During this time only the a↵ected transactions and data items will be unavailable to
be use so, we aim to minimize this time as much as possible.
Since our work is novel in the context of damage assessment in fog computing, there is no
existing work that we can compare the performance of the proposed systems against. For this
reason, the aim is to implement, test, and evaluate the proposed models and prove that they
are not only applicable but also accurate, scalable, and reasonable in the reported delays.
However, in some models , we compare the performance of the proposed sub-models against
each other to see which model is better for di↵erent circumstances.

3.6.3

Data-set

3.6.3.1

Log Files:

Since there is no available data-set for the log files of fog node computing, and this
work is novel, we generated random log files, vary in length, for every fog node in the system.
The contents of the log files may be di↵erent for each model based on given assumptions.
For example, in the first model the read operations and their values, as seen previously in
the section 3, will be added to the log files for that model. We performed our experiments
based on the three log file sizes described above, beginning with 100 transactions in each
log file and following through with 500, and finally 1000. The data dependency between the
fog nodes was inserted arbitrarily into the log files. Here is an example of the generated log
files: [ r1 (361,688) r2 (345,669) w4 (372,607,689) r5 (207,651) w1 (227,688,688) w2 (345,669,621)
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r3 (399,653) r4 (282,634) w5 (207,651,612) c1 c2 w3 (399,653,635) r4 (361,688) w5 (374,678,643)
w3 (279,657,640) c4 c5 c3 r6 (238,689) w7 (207,612,636) r8 (356,641) r9 (323,683) w6 (238,689,604)
w7 (262,679,633) w8 (356,641,654) w9 (323,683,635) w6 (345,621,636) c7 c8 c9 w6 (286,646,677)
c6 w10 (313,663,685) r10 (351,604) c10 ] Below we explain the notations used for read, write,
and commit operations respectively.
• r2 (345,669): is reading operation where rtransaction number (data item, value)
• w2 (345,669,621): is writing operation where wtransaction number ( data item, old value,
new value)
• c2 : The transaction 2 has been committed which means it is successfully completed.
3.6.3.2

Graphs

We used the adjacency list for directed graph representation due to its speed and
space efficiency technique [79]. In this situation, we represent the transaction T as vertex
V in the directed graphs. If there are |T | in the log files, then each list can have up to
|T |

1 transactions depend on the transaction dependency that we explained previously.

Each vertex in the adjacency list can be reached in constant time since we need only to refer
to an array.
Regarding the space complexity of the adjacency list, it is the best case scenario
of graph representation techniques for storing the directed graph in the computer. This
technique will save substantial space. Thus, the adjacency list will only take up to ⇥(V + E)
space, where V is the set of vertices which in our models is the number of transactions in
the log file T , and E is the set of edges which are the dependencies between two transactions
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[80]. Additionally, the adjacency list allows us to easily insert a new edge or vertex without
extra cost as we are using a linked list structure and this representation is more informatic
and provides easier tracking of any adjacent nodes of node.
All local and global directed graphs were built simultaneously when the log files
were generated based on transaction-dependency relationships between the transactions, as
previously explained in Chapter 5. With each log file, two graphs were generated, one for
the model where there is no trusted fog node (no global graph) in the system and the other
one for the model where there is a trusted fog node in the system. The global graphs for
the trusted fog node were also generated for any transaction that accessed a data item from
another fog data service node in the system, as we elucidated in Chapter 5. The log files
and graphs were manually rechecked and examined as ground truth to ensure the correctness
and accuracy of the algorithms.
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3.6.4

Evaluation First Model: Ensuring Data Integrity in Fog Computing Based
Healthcare Systems
In the healthcare systems model, we introduced two sub-models for fog computing

systems that manage healthcare data. The first one is an architecture using fog computing
with homogeneous data; the second one is an architecture using fog computing with heterogeneous data. Then for each sub-model we proposed appropriate algorithms to determine
the e↵ect of an attack on the system and identify damaged data.
In this experiment our goal was to determine two important points. First, for each
model we needed to study the behavior of the damage assessment algorithm as it detected
a↵ected data items with varying factors designed for the experiment. Second, we performed
experiments to highlight the di↵erences between the two models. Which is the better performing of the two and which factors influence that outcome?
As we mentioned in the simulation section, we generated di↵erent sets of log files.
Each set represented the number of fog nodes in the system with a di↵erent number of
transactions in the log file. So, in the experiment we began with a fixed number of fog nodes
each time and a di↵erent number of transactions in each log file. Each time a malicious
transaction was randomly inserted the results were classified into three di↵erent sets, of
a↵ected transactions. The first set is a set of less than five identified, a↵ected transactions.
Ten to 15 identified, a↵ected transactions made up the second set. The third set of identified,
a↵ected transactions numbers twenty to twenty-five. This transaction clustering is important
in making a fair and reasonable comparison of the proposed algorithms as they are impacted
by other factors including the number of fog nodes and the number of transactions in each log
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file. Each transaction in each set was repeated approximately twenty times. Then the total
time, from insertion of the malicious transaction until all a↵ected data items in the system
were identified, was computed. The time required for each set to identify the damaged
transactions was then averaged. This average was calculated for use in investigating and
evaluating our approach. We compared the results, determining the factor or factors having
a greater or lesser impact to the algorithms.
• First Sub-Model “Fog Node Distribution with Homogeneous Data”
3.6.4.1

First Experiment: The impact of log file size on di↵erent number of fog
nodes in the homogeneous data model:

Figs. 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 explain the relationship between the number of transactions
in each log file, the number of a↵ected transactions, and the average time required by our
system to detect all a↵ected data items in the whole system. The average time was calculated
by averaging the detection time each set required to complete the tasks. The results show
that a log file of 100 transactions will take the system approximately 34 to 36 ms to detect all
a↵ected data items in the whole system no matter the number of a↵ected transactions. The
delay time in detecting all a↵ected data items in log files of 500 transactions increased by
approximately 21- 23 ms. The delay time for the system to identify all a↵ected transactions
in log files of 1000 transactions was only around 17 to 18 ms more than that, when compared
to 500 transaction log files, and almost the double the time the system required to identify
the a↵ected transactions in log files of 100 transactions. So, the length of time the system
remains unavailable is considerably impacted by the number of transactions in the log files.
This applies regardless of the number of fog nodes or the number of a↵ected transactions in
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each log file.
5 Fog Nodes
80.0000

Average Delay (ms)

77.1037

75.4021

75.0660

70.0000
60.0000

59.3570

58.3696

56.7130

50.0000
40.0000
30.0000

36.4893

35.7348

35.3232

20.0000
LESS THAN 5

10 -15

20 -25

Number of Affected Transactions
100 T

500 T

1000 T

Figure 3.3: The impact of log file size on five fog nodes in the homogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.4: The impact of log file size on ten fog nodes in the homogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.5: The impact of log file size on fifteen fog nodes in the homogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.6: The impact of log file size on twenty fog nodes in the homogeneous data model.
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3.6.4.2

Second Experiment:The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and
sets of a↵ected transactions on various size of log files in the homogeneous data model:

This experiment was designed to evaluate the performance of our detection algorithm
in identifying all data items a↵ected by the introduction of a malicious transaction. Figs.
3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 summarize the relationship between the number of fog nodes and the
sets of a↵ected transactions. Again, each log file was fixed in sets of 100, 500, and 1000
transactions. The goal of this experiment was to discover and study the impact of the
di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions and the various number of fog nodes to our damage
assessment algorithm.
Figs. 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 show that our algorithm performs essentially the same regardless of log file size. The damage assessment algorithm detected all a↵ected data items with
a marginal change in time required to complete the task, either increasing or decreasing by
less than 0.5 ms, when the number of fog nodes increased. This held true regardless of log
file size. Furthermore, the number of a↵ected transactions in each set had only slight impact
on delay time: at roughly 0.5 to 1 ms.
Figs 3.7 through 3.9 further illustrate that the set of five a↵ected transactions entailed
less time than the other two sets for all variants of log file size and number of fog nodes.
Additionally, the set of ten to fifteen a↵ected transactions, for the most part, exacted less
time than the set of twenty to twenty-five. The little change that occurred here was due to
the algorithm computation.
In brief, these experiments have shown that the earlier IDS identifies malicious trans-
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actions, the more efficient and faster damage assessment can be made and that the size of
the log file has the most impact on delay time.
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Figure 3.7: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 100 T in the homogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.8: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 500 T in the homogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.9: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 1000 T in the homogeneous data model.

• Second Sub-Model: “Fog Nodes Distribution with Heterogeneous Data”
3.6.4.3

Third Experiment: The impact of log file size on di↵erent number of
fog nodes in the heterogeneous data model:

This experiment uses the same variables as the experiment described in section 3.6.4.1.
We computed the average time the algorithm exacts to identify all a↵ected data items in
the whole system. The number of fog nodes was fixed to five, then to ten, fifteen, and
twenty, respectively. The numbers of transactions on each log file varied from 100 to 500,
then to 1000. The results were classified in di↵erent sets as indicated in Figs. 3.10, 3.11,
3.12, and 3.13. The results show that a 100 transaction log file, results in a delay time
around 36 to 42 ms for detection of all a↵ected data items in the whole system for less than
five a↵ected transactions. And the delay time to detect the same set in a 500 transaction
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log file increased to 51 to 79 ms. A 1000 transaction log file with fewer than five a↵ected
transactions, rendered a delay time of 100 to 119 ms in identification of all a↵ected data
items. This increase in delay time as it relates to the number of transactions in the log file
remains consistent regardless of the number of fog nodes or a↵ected transactions in each log
file. As the number of transactions in the log files has a major e↵ect on delay time, system
availability becomes further compromised as the transaction count per log file increases.
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Figure 3.10: The impact of log file size on five fog nodes in the Heterogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.11: The impact of log file size on ten fog nodes in the Heterogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.12: The impact of log file size on fifteen fog nodes in the Heterogeneous data
model.
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Figure 3.13: The impact of log file size on twenty fog nodes in the Heterogeneous data
model.

3.6.4.4

Fourth Experiment: The impact of di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions
on various number of fog nodes in the heterogeneous data model:

The second experiment was implemented to observe the impact of the di↵erent sets
of a↵ected transactions in the heterogeneous data model. Figs. 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17
represent the results. The findings observed in this experiment are di↵erent than that of the
experiments in section 3.6.4.2 for the homogeneous data model. The results here show that
a log file of 100 transactions produces, a delay time in ms that jumped from the thirties
for detecting the set of less than five a↵ected transactions to the fifties for ten to fifteen
a↵ected transactions, and into the seventies for twenty to twenty-five a↵ected transactions.
The delay time to detect the a↵ected data items in a log file of 500 varied from the small set
of a↵ected transactions to the larger set, ranging from ms in the 70’s for the set of less than
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five a↵ected transactions to ms in the 150’s for the set of 20 to 25. The 1000 transaction log
files registered a delay time around the 100’s to 170’s ms to identify all a↵ected data items
. So, unlike the homogeneous data model, in this model the number of a↵ected transactions
in the system has significant e↵ect on the total time the system remains unavailable.
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Figure 3.14: The impact of di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on five fog nodes in the
heterogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.15: The impact of di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on ten fog nodes in the
heterogeneous data model

Figure 3.16: The impact of di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on fifteen fog nodes in
the heterogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.17: The impact of di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on twenty fog nodes in
the heterogeneous data model.

3.6.4.5

Fifth Experiment: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets
of a↵ected transactions on various size of log files in the heterogeneous
data model:

Investigation was also conducted into the relationship between the number of fog
nodes and the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions. Figs. 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20 describe
the results. The number of transactions on each log file here was fixed to 100, then 500,
and finally to 1000. The objective was to study the impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected
transactions with a variable number of fog nodes while keeping a fixed number of transactions
in the fog file. As we see in these figures, the performance of the proposed algorithm generated
roughly the same outcome with all di↵erent log file sizes. We found that the time needed for
our damage assessment algorithm to detect all a↵ected data items increased by 1 - 10 ms,
when the number of fog nodes increased. This remained consistent regardless of log file size.
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Figure 3.18: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 100 T in the heterogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.19: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 500 T in the heterogeneous data model.
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Figure 3.20: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 1000 T in the heterogeneous data model.

3.6.4.6

Sixth Experiment: Fog Nodes Distribution with Homogeneous Data
Model versus Heterogeneous Data Model:

These experiments were executed to demonstrate the di↵erence between the two proposed models and to discover, in consideration of all variables, which of the two is the better
performer. Figs. 3.21, 3.22, and 3.23 illustrate an overall comparison of the average total
time latency in milliseconds between these models . The result, supported by these figures,
indicates that the first model, the homogeneous model, performs better with all di↵erent
sets of a↵ected transactions.
However, with the smaller set of less than five a↵ected transactions and smaller log
file of 100 transactions, the di↵erence was slight; the first model exceeded the second by only
1 - 3 ms ( Fig. 3.21). With the same smaller set of less than five a↵ected transactions the
di↵erence between the two models was a more significant 10 to 20 ms when the number of
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transactions increased from 100 to 500. Increasing the size of log files to 1000 transactions
again rendered a significant di↵erence of 20 to 30 ms. Figs. 3.22 and 3.23 illustrate the
clearly meaningful di↵erence between the two models with the introduction of the two larger
sets of a↵ected transactions. Briefly, the first model required less time than the second
model, by half in log files of 500 transactions, and by a third in log files of 1000 transactions.
The explanation for that lies in the number of fog nodes that will be a↵ected by the
malicious transaction. With the small set of less than five a↵ected transactions, the damage
will usually only a↵ect an average of up to three fog nodes. In the worst case, the architecture
of the first model will prevent the damage of one malicious transaction from spreading to
more than two fog nodes .
But in the second model the larger set of a↵ected transactions could impact a greater
number of fog nodes. So each log file in each a↵ected fog node must be scanned in the second
model, while the first model need only scan two fog nodes at most, the initial a↵ected Fog
Monitor node and the FDR fog node if it read the damaged data items. This scanning
requirement is also the reason that causes the variations in delay time in the second model.
As shown in Fig. 3.23 there are noticeable di↵erences in average delay time from one group of
fog nodes to another in the second model with 1000 transactions. For example, if a malicious
transaction a↵ected fifteen transactions in the system, then all those a↵ected transactions
could be in one fog node or in five fog nodes or more.
In closing, the model with homogeneous data stabilizes the results and speeds the
detection process, minimizing the system’s unavailability. Although, the model with heterogeneous data is needed as well because it is more appropriately applicable to most situations.
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Figure 3.21: Comparison between homogeneous data model and heterogeneous data model
on a set of less than five a↵ected transactions
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Figure 3.22: Comparison between homogeneous data model and heterogeneous data model
on set of 10 to 15 a↵ected Transactions
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Figure 3.23: Comparison between homogeneous data model and heterogeneous data model
on a set of 20 -25 a↵ected Transactions
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4

Ensuring Data Integrity in Fog Computing Based Critical Infrastructure

Systems Model

Some of the following paragraphs, figures, and algorithms that will be introduced in
this chapter have been already published in our work [48] as shown in the publications and
reprint permissions chapter 7.

4.1

Introduction
These days the Internet of Things (IoT) is prevalent and trending as evidenced by the

significant increase in wearable technology, smart homes and buildings, connected vehicles,
and smart grids. The estimated number of connected IoT and smart devices by 2025 is
expected to become 75 billion worldwide [1]. This will produce an enormous amount of data
that are predicted to total more than 79 zettabytes [2]. Due to the limitation and restriction
of bandwidth, as well as the rapid growth in the amount of data produced, the current
architecture of internet systems will be inadequate to manage and move that volume of data
to the cloud. In many scenarios, this will be impossible to do, especially with the increasing
number of IoT devices in use. Furthermore, some sensitive and real-time applications play
integral roles in our lives, such as connected car technologies, video conference applications,
and health monitoring devices, all of which require low-latency and location awareness to
provide satisfying and high-quality services [4].
In addition, IoT devices such as smart meters in modern smart cities will not only
produce a massive amount of data but the heterogeneity of that data will need to be processed
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in real-time [23]. This data will not be valuable enough without exploiting the maximum
benefits from other technologies. It is unmanageable and nearly impossible for the cloud to
handle by itself so many kinds of tasks, such as processing the aggregate data, analyzing
them, and storing them [24]. For that reason, fog computing was presented by Cisco [6].
Fog computing is a decentralized computing infrastructure that allows end users’ data to be
computed, stored, and promoted on other applications and network services that are located
between the data source and the cloud computing data centers.
Fog computing technology is trending these days because it has several characteristics
that can improve the efficiency of transporting data to the cloud. This is very significant in
the age of cloud processing because it complements cloud computing and allows analytics to
perform resource, intensive, and extended term analytics [10]. One of the essential characteristics of fog computing is its location at the edge of networks, providing end users with
high-quality services and low latency. Many current devices and applications, such as smart
meters, networked games, and video streaming, require location awareness and low latency
to provide a higher quality of service and performance. Alternative fundamental characteristics are the widely dispersed and significant numbers of fog nodes that will be geographically
available. This design supports mobility in many applications, including service in moving
vehicles. The utilization of fog computing will also contribute to the benefits of conserving
bandwidth and enhancing the privacy and security of sensitive data. Most of the data will
be processed locally at the fog node, meaning that the amount of data needing to be sent
to the cloud for processing will be diminished, thereby minimizing bandwidth consumption
and maximizing the privacy of transmitting sensitive data [8, 9].
In the potential for smart cities, fog computing will help the IoT and smart meter
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devices process the data and make quick decisions to take the right action within a critical
time-frame and to aggregate only the indispensable data for the cloud. Services and utility
companies, such as water and electric companies, can exploit fog computing technology to
manage and analyze the volume of consumers’ data. There are many existing studies on how
to expand the efficiency of fog computing in smart cities and to solve technical issues related
to the large volume of data that needs fusion and integration to the cloud [22]. Moreover,
while security and privacy issues have been addressed by many researchers, other aspects
need more attention, such as a case in which a protection system fails during a cyberattack
and costumers’ data need to be recovered. This study aims to detect all transactions that
are a↵ected by any malicious transaction, recover the correct value of data, and ensure the
integrity of consumer data in a fog computing environment in smart cities.

4.2

The Model
In this section, a unique architecture for using a distributed fog node system in smart

cities to manage the consumer data of utility services will be proposed. Then, cooperative algorithms will be pro↵ered for identifying, assessing, recovering, and restoring all the
damaged and a↵ected data created by an attack. The goal is the restoration of a reliable
database. In the proposed model, it is assumed that the Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
is responsible for detecting malicious transactions in the system and providing a list of those
transactions to the damage assessment algorithms. Each fog node in the proposed architecture must have its own log file and use a strict serializable history. All operations in the
log file need to be in the same order in the history. The log files cannot be user modified
at any time. Since the log files will contain a record of every modification to the value of
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any data item that is updated by write operations, all read operations are also required to
be stored in the log files to identify the data dependencies between the operations and the
transactions and among the detections of the victim fog nodes in the systems.

4.3

Model Nations
Table 5.1 shows a list of the notations and descriptions to be used in our proposed

approach.
Table 4.1: Notation used in our proposed approach description
Notation
pub fog
usc fog
MT L
DA Table

DI L
DIT Fogx

VIT Fogx

wi (A, v1, v2)

ri (A, v)
ci
ai

Description
The public fog nodes that are accessed by customers and utilities
providers.
The private fog node for each utility service company.
The list of detected malicious transactions done by IDS.
The damage audit table, which is a data structure that will be created by the damage assessment algorithms to collect any data about
transactions that are needed to do the data recovery, such as the valid
and invalid read data items, data written, and the accessed fogs.
The damage item list that will contain all damaged data items that
are identified by our proposed damage assessment algorithms.
The Fogx damage item table, where x is the ID of the secondary
a↵ected fog node, which reads some of the damage data items from
another fog node.
The valid data items table that will be created by algorithms 3 or 4 to
add to it all recovered data items for the secondary a↵ected fog node
Fogx . It will be sent to Fogx to use it as input on algorithm 4.
The write operation of the transaction Ti; v1 is the before image,
which represents the old value of the data item A before the update.
And v2 is the after image, which is the new value of data item A after
the update.
The read operation of transaction Ti where A is the data item and v
is the current value of A.
The transaction Ti has been committed which means it is successfully
completed and it will be recorded to the database.
The transaction Ti has been aborted and it will not a↵ect the
database.
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4.4

The Proposed Architecture
In the proposed model, each smart city will have several public fog nodes (pub fog),

which will be efficiently distributed to guarantee the quality of service at each point and
in all corners of the city. Private fog nodes will be included, with at least one private fog
node for utility service companies (usc fog), such as water, electricity, and gas utilities. The
usc fog nodes should be e↵ectively located in the center of the whole distributed system to
ensure a reliable connection to all pub fog nodes and provide di↵erent routes should one
of the pub fog nodes disconnect for any reason. Consumers will be able to send queries
to pub fog nodes only. Data may be retrieved from the local database if available there.
Otherwise, the queries will be forwarded to the appropriate usc fog node. Consumers are
not allowed to directly connect the usc fog nodes for security reasons. All queries related
to those nodes will come through the pub fog nodes. Customer utility usage data will be
collected from smart homes and buildings using IoT devices and smart meters. Usage data
will be sent to the nearest efficient pub fog nodes based on several factors, such as location
and load balance.
It is assumed that each pub fog node in the system will have the ability to perform
some essential data operations, such as calculating customer average usage over a specific
time frame or aggregating the totals of selected data values. Those operations are fundamental to optimization of the network bandwidth since the data sent over the network will
be diminished by aggregating the necessary data.
Additionally, as most customer data will be processed locally, at the edge of the
network, it will enhance privacy and security by reducing sensitive data transmittal. Each
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Figure 4.1: The proposed architecture.

utility usc fog node receiving the data will also perform some essential computations, such
as calculating the daily bill and average daily customer usage. These computations by
the utilities are important in improving the quality of services in each city as the need for
expansion of services in peak seasons may become evident and shortages avoided. Utilities
may use data to plan fuel purchases or raise consumer awareness regarding consumption and
conservation. We assume that the city and all fog nodes in the system are in the same time
zone and use the same official local time.
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4.5
4.5.1

The Proposed Damage Assessment Algorithms
Algorithm 1: The Main Damage Assessment Algorithm
The IDS is responsible for identifying the attacking transactions and sending a list

of them to the victim fog node. Whenever one or more malicious transactions are found on
any fog node in the system, the IDS will detect them and send them as a list (MT L) to
that fog node to be used as input in the proposed schemes. Once the fog node receives the
list, it will launch Algorithm 1, which is the main damage assessment algorithm.
As soon as Algorithm 1 is launched, it will create the damage audit table (DA Table)
and damage data item list (DI L). Both will be initialized to null. Then, the algorithm
will scan the local log file of the victim fog node, Fog1 , beginning from the first attacking
transaction of (MT L) list, Ti . Ti will be added as a new record into DA Table since it is
the first attacking transaction. If the attacking transaction updates at least one data item,
then this data item will be damaged, and any other updating transactions that read this
data will be a↵ected as well. It important to collect and store all data items that have been
updated and damaged by the attacking transactions. Then, all transactions that have read
those damaged data items can be identified, and data dependency can be declared between
the transactions and the fog nodes in the entire system.
One of the main functionalities of this algorithm will be the collection of data before
damage occurs, and store those images, which represent the pre-attack value of the data
item, in the written data column on the DA Table. These images will be used later in the
recovery algorithm. Simultaneously, those damaged data items will be added to the damaged
item list to determine data dependency.
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Also, the algorithm will examine every transaction in the log file following, the first
attack, to determine whether any other transaction is an attacking transaction, or a data
access transaction from another fog node, or an updating write transaction. In the case
where the transaction is an attacking transaction, the algorithm will perform as in the first
attacking transaction. However, if the transaction is an access transaction from another fog
node (Fogx), the algorithm will check every data item that has been read by Fogx. A new
damage item table for Fogx (DIT Fogx) will be created and all damaged data items that
have been read by Fogx as well as the transaction identification and timestamp of each data
item, will be added to the DIT Fogx.
Since a fog node may access the same data multiple times, it is essential to know the
transaction ID and time of access (timestamp); this will make it easy to find on its log file
and confirm that the damaged data items were not corrected later on in the fogx by valid
updating. In the meantime, the DA Table will be updated indicating that Fogx has read
the damaged data item, so when the recovery algorithm has successfully corrected the value
of the damaged data item, it will send the correct value to Fogx to use as input for its own
recovery algorithm.
If the transaction is an updating transaction (Tw ), and not an attacking transaction
belonging to the malicious transaction list, then it must be added to the DA Table and
examined to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to determine data dependency. All read
operations must be checked to confirm whether Tw has read any of the damaged data items
that already exist to the damaged item list. If so, those damaged data items will be added
to the invalid read column of Tw , and undamaged data items will be added to the valid read
column. Then, all the write operations will be checked to determine whether any have read
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Algorithm 4.1 The Main Damage Assessment Algorithm
1: Create a new DA table and initialize to null
2: Create a new DI L and initialize to null
3: for every Ti the local log starting from the first attacking transactions of MT L do
4: if Ti is attacking transaction then
5:
add it as a new record into DA Table every wi (A, v1, v2)
6:
add (A, v1) pair to data written column
7:
add A to the DI L if it is not there
8:
9: else if Ti is transaction from another fog node x then every data item A read by Ti
10:
if A 2 DI L then
11:
if DIT Fogx does not exist then
12:
Create a new DIT Fogx where x is the ID of aimed fog node that reads the
a↵ected transaction
13:
Mark Ti as a↵ected transaction
14:
Add Ti and A into DIT Fogx
15:
Update the last column of DA Table
16:
end if
17:
end if
18:
19: else if Ti is updating transaction then
20:
add it as a new record into DA Table every ri (A, v)
21:
if A 2 DI L then
22:
add A to invalid read column
23:
add (A, v) to valid read column
24:
end if
25:
26:
for every wi (A, v1, v2) do
27:
if invalid read column of Ti 6= ? then
28:
add (A, v2) to data written column
29:
add A to the DI L if it is not there check If (A 2 DI L)
30:
add (A, v2) to data written column
31:
delete A from DI L
32:
end if
33:
end for
34:
if ci is found & (both invalid read and data written columns of Ti ) = ? then
35:
delete the record of Ti from DA Table
36:
else if ai is found then
37:
delete the record Ti from DA Table
38:
end if
39: end if
40: end for
41: Send DIT Fogx to Fogx to do further detection
42: Send DA Table & DI L for data recovery (algorithm 3)
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damaged data items. If so, that means the damage has spread and the written data item is
also corrupted. Therefore, it will be added to the damaged item list, if it is not already there.
However, if the transaction Tw updates any data item, (A), without reading any items from
the damaged item list, then the data item (A) will be further checked evaluate its inclusion
in the damaged item list. If (A) was updated without reading a corrupted transaction,
that means it is a valid write and the data item (A) has been refreshed, so (A) must be
removed from the damaged item list as in steps(28-30). The new value will be added to the
data written column, accomplishing the second goal of adding the non-attacking updating
transaction to the DA Table. Steps (31-34) will remove the unnecessary records from the
damaged audit table in the case where the Tw is aborted or both invalid read and data
written columns of Tw are empty. Finally, the damage item table DIT fogx will be sent to
fogx to do further detection, while the damage audit table and damage item list will be sent
to Algorithm 3, which is the main data recovery algorithm.

4.5.2

Algorithm 2: Secondary Fog Node Damage Assessment Algorithm
This algorithm is similar to the previous one, which is Algorithm 1, but there are

some di↵erences. The main di↵erence in the input of this algorithm is the damage item
table (DIT Fogx ), which is one of the outputs of Algorithm 1. Let us say that fog1 is the
main victim fog node in the system, and it was attacked and maliciously updated in the
transaction Ti , which wrote the data item Z. Later on, the transaction Tj indicated that
fogx has accessed fog1 and read Z. Then, fogx updated some other data items, such as N
and M, on its database based on data item Z. Here we call fogx the secondary a↵ected fog
node. Once the secondary a↵ected fog node in our example (fogx ) receives the damage item
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table (DIT fogx ) that contains Z as a damaged data item, its transaction ID (Tj ), and its
timestamp say 9:00:00 AM, it will create a new damage audit table and initialize it to null.
Note that this algorithm will use the received damage item table (DIT fogx ) to store and
track the damage data items instead of creating a new damage item list. The list data
structure will not be supportive here since the exact time and transaction ID of the damage
data items must be known.
The algorithm will scan the log file and start from the first a↵ected transaction from
the received table. Therefore, whenever an a↵ected transaction that belongs to DIT fogx is
found, the steps (3-12) will insert it as new record to the damage audit table and check each
read operations if its belong to DIT fogx then add it to the invalid read column; otherwise,
it will be added to the valid read column. Moreover, for the write operations, the updated
data items along with its new values will be added to the data written column as well as
they will be added to the DIT fogx table if they are not there. In our example, data items
N and M will be added to the DIT fogx and the data written column in DA Table. The
rest of the algorithm is the same as Algorithm 1 except when any data damage is found, the
time of its occurrence must be taken into account. Therefore, if fogx reads the data items M
and N at any time before 9:00:00 AM and then updates some other data item value, those
updating transactions will not be a↵ected. In a like manner, the damage item table, if there
is one, will be sent to fogy while the damage audit table and damage item list will be sent
to Algorithm 4, which is data recovery algorithm for the secondary fog node. The process
continues until all the a↵ected transactions in the entire system are detected.
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Algorithm 4.2 Secondary Fog Node Damage Assessment
Once Fogx receives the DIT Fogx
1: Create a new DA table and initialize to null
2: for every Ti in the local log starting from the first a↵ected transaction on DIT Fogx do
3: if Ti 2 DIT Fogx && mark as a↵ected then
4:
add a record for Ti into DA Table
5:
for every ri (A, v) do
6:
if A 2 DIT Fogx then
7:
add A to invalid read column
8:
add (A, v) to valid read column
9:
end if
10:
end for
11:
for every wi (A, v1, v2) do
12:
add (A, v2) pair to data written column
13:
add A into DIT Fogx if it is not there
14:
end for
15: else if Ti is transaction from another fog node y then
16:
for every data item A read by Ti do
17:
if A 2 DIT Fogx & Ti Timestamp Timestamp of damaged data item transaction then
18:
if DIT Fogy does not exist then
19:
Create a new DIT Fogy where y is the ID of aimed fog node that reads the
a↵ected transaction
20:
Mark Ti as a↵ected transaction
21:
Add Ti and A into DIT Fogy
22:
Update the last column of DA Table
23:
end if
24:
end if
25:
end for
26: else if Ti is updating transaction then
27:
add it as a new record into DA Table
28:
for every ri (A, v) do
29:
if A 2 DIT Fogx & Ti Timestamp Timestamp of damaged data item transaction then
30:
add A to invalid read column
31:
add (A, v) to valid read column
32:
end if
33:
end for
34:
for every wi (A, v1, v2) do
35:
if invalid read column of Ti 6= ? then
36:
add (A, v2) to data written column
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37:
38:
39:
40:
41:
42:
43:
44:
45:
46:
47:
48:
49:
50:

add a record of Ti into DIT Fogx with data item A if it is not there check If
(A 2 DIT Fogx )
add (A, v2) to data written column
delete A from DIT Fogx
end if
end for
if ci is found & (both invalid read and data written columns of Ti ) = ? then
delete the record of Ti from DA Table
else if ai is found then
delete the record Ti from DA Table
end if
end if
end for
Send DIT Fogy to Fogy to do further detection
Send DA Table & DIT Fogx for recovery (algorithm 4)

4.6
4.6.1

The Proposed Data Recovery Algorithms
Algorithm 3: The Main Data Recovery Algorithm
Immediately after Algorithm 1 has accomplished its task and sent the damage audit

table (DA Table) and damage item list (DI L) to the main data recovery algorithm, which is
Algorithm 3, all the data items in the main victim fog node will be available to be used except
the damaged data items. Therefore, the availability of the system will be increased. Once
Algorithm 3 receives the damage audit table, it will scan only the records of the DA Table
that reads invalid data items. Whenever a record of the data items in the invalid read column
is found, the algorithm will perform three important steps. In the first step, it will take each
data item A in the invalid read column and scan the data written column upward, beginning
from the former record of DA Table, to find the last updated value of A, which must have
the correct value. Then, this value will be added as a pair (A, v) to the valid read column,
and data item A will be deleted from the invalid read column and so on until all the data
items in the invalid read column in the same record have been recovered. The second step
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is to recompute each data item in the data written column in the same record by reading
the new values from the valid read column. Certainly, after those two steps are successfully
completed, all the data items in that record should have the correct values, as no attacking
has occurred. The last step is to check the last column in the same record, which is the
column (fog ID), to find out if any data item from that record has been read by another fog
node in the system; if so, a new valid data items table (VIT Fogx ) will be created for each
a↵ected fog node if it does not exist yet. Then, the transaction ID along with the correct
new values of each accessed data item will be added to VIT Fogx. As soon as all the records
in the damage audit table have been examined and all three steps are checked, the VIT Fogx
table will be sent to the corresponding fog node Fogx . Finally, in steps 14-18, the new log
that has just been generated while the data recovery algorithm is in process will be checked
to make sure all the data items have correct and valid values.

4.6.2

Algorithm 4: Secondary Fog Node Data Recovery Algorithm
This algorithm is also similar to the main data recovery algorithm, Algorithm 3,

excluding two main di↵erences. The first is the input of Algorithm 4 will be three tables two
of them come from Algorithm 2 for the same fog node which they are the damage audit table
DA Table and the damage item table (DIT Fogx ). And the third table input is the new valid
data items table (VIT Fogx ) which comes from the data recovery algorithm of another fog
node. Secondly, this algorithm will check every record on the received damaged audit table.
When an a↵ected transaction is found, then every data item A in the invalid column will be
deleted after copying the (A, v) pair from the corresponding transaction on the VIT Fogx
table to the valid data column on DA Table. After all the damaged data items have been
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Algorithm 4.3 The Main Recovery Algorithm
1: for each record in the DA Table do
2: if invalid read column of Ti 6= ? then
3:
for every data item A in invalid read column do
4:
find the last updated (A, v) pair in data written column of DA Table from the
former records
5:
add (A, v) to valid read column
6:
delete A from invalid read column
7:
end for
8:
for every A in data written column do
9:
recalculate the value of A using values in the valid read column
10:
end for
11:
if any fogx is existing in fog ID column then
12:
if VIT Fogx does not exist then
13:
Create a new VIT Fogx where x is the ID of aimed fog node that reads the
a↵ected transaction
14:
end if
15:
Add Ti and the (A, v) pair which is the correct value of A into VIT Fogx
16:
end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: Send VIT Fogx to Fogx node
20: for every A in DI L do
21: check the new log that has just been created while the recovery process was in progress
22: if A is not modified in the log then
23:
scan data written column of DA Table upward to find last updated value of A
24:
substitute the value of A in the database with v
25: end if
26: end for
deleted on each record of the DA Table, the data written column will be checked to discern
if it is empty or not. If not, then the value v of each data item A in the data written column
needs to be recalculated by using the new values in the valid read column. However, the
same procedure used in Algorithm 3 will be employed if the record has a transaction with
some data items on the invalid read column. The process continues until all the a↵ected
data items in the entire system are recovered to a consistent state.
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Algorithm 4.4 Secondary Fog Node Recovery Algorithm
Once Fogx receives the VIT Fogx
1: for each record in the DA Table do
2: if Ti is a↵ected transaction then
3:
for every data item A in invalid read column do
4:
copy the (A, v) pair from corresponding transaction on the VIT Fogx to the valid
data column on DA Table
5:
delete A from invalid read column
6:
end for
7:
if the data written column 6= ? then
8:
for every A in data written column do
9:
recalculate the value of A using values in the valid read column
10:
end for
11:
end if
12: else if Ti is updating transaction & invalid read column 6= ? then
13:
for every A in invalid read column do
14:
find the last updated (A, v) pair in data written column of DA Table from the
former records
15:
add (A, v) to valid read column
16:
delete A from invalid read column
17:
end for
18:
for every A in data written column do
19:
recalculate the value of A using values in the valid read column
20:
end for
21:
if any fogy is existing in fog ID column then
22:
if VIT Fogy does not exist then
23:
Create a new VIT Fogy where y is the ID of aimed fog node that reads the
a↵ected transaction
24:
end if
25:
Add Ti and the (A, v) pair which is the correct value of A into VIT Fogy
26:
end if
27:
28:
Send VIT Fogy to Fogy node
29:
for every A in DIT Fogx do
30:
check the new log that has just been created while the recovery process was in
progress
31:
if A is not modified in the log then
32:
scan data written column of DA Table upward to find last updated value of A
33:
substitute the value of A in the database with v
34:
end if
35:
end for
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4.7

An Example
To clarify the proposed scheme, let us consider the following example. Let us have in

our smart city three fog nodes. Fog1 and Fog2 are public fog nodes to collect consumer data
using smart meters. Fogx is a private fog node for the utility company to manage aggregated
data and calculate some important things, such as the bills and the amount of consumption.
Consider the following log schedules for each one of them:
SFog.1 = r1 (A, 5 ) r1 (B, 4 ) w1 (C, 11, 9 ) w1 (G, 3, 9 ) r2 (B, 4 )c1 r2 (G, 9 ) w2 (A, 5, 13 )
w2 (D, 0, 13 )c2 fog2 .r3 (G, 9 )c3 w4 (A, 13, 5 ) w4 (G, 2, 3 )c4 r5 (D, 13 ) r5 (A, 5 ) r5 (C, 9 ) w5 (D,
2, 27 )c5 r6 (B, 4 ) w6 (B, 4, 4 ) r6 (D, 16 ) w6 (D, 16, 20 ) r6 (A, 5 ) w6 (A, 5, 25 )c6 fog2 .r7 (D,
20 )c7 r8 (C, 9)c8 w9 (C, 9, 11)c9 r10 (A, 25 ) r10 (C, 11 ) w10 (E, 10, 36 )c10 fog2 .r11 (E, 36 )c11
SFog.2 = r9 (K, 3) r9 (fog1 .T3 .G, 9 ) w9 (K, 3, 12 ) c9 r10 (M, 10 ) r10 (K, 12 ) w10 (M, 10,
22 )c10 fogx .r11 (M, 22 ) c11 . . . r14 (fog1 .T7 .D, 20 ) r14 (L, 4 ) w14 (N, 17, 24 ) c14 r16 (fog1 .T11. E,
36 ) w16 (P, 4 , 36 )c16 fogx .r17 (P, 36 ) c17
SFog.x = r8 (O, 6 ) w8 (F, 6, 7 )c8 r9 (fog2 .T11 .M, 22 ) r9 (H, 10) w9 (I, 14, 32 )c9 w10 (J,
0, 18 ) c10 r11 (fog2 .T17 .P, 36 ) r11 (J, 18 ) w11 (Q, 60, 54 ) c11 r12 (Q, 54 ) r12 (U, 12) w12 (R, 57,
66 )c12
Now, suppose the IDS detects the first transaction T1 on the Fog1 schedule as an
attacking transaction and data items (C) and (G) as being maliciously updated. Therefore,
the IDS will send the detected transaction T1 as the list (MT L) to Fog1 . Once Fog1 receives
the list, it will launch Algorithm 1 since it is the main victim fog node in the system. Then,
it will create a new damage audit table (DA Table) and a new damage items list (DI L).
Consequently, the log file of Fog1 will be scanned, starting from the first attacking transaction
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on the MT L, which is T1 . Whenever an attacking transaction is found, such as T1 in our
example, it will be added to the DA Table as a new record. All the write operations of T1
will also be checked, so whenever a data item is found, it will be added along with its old
“before image” value as a pair to the data written column, and the data items will be added
to the damaged items list if they are not already there. In our example, the pairs (C, 11),
(G, 3) are added to the data written column (see Table 4.2) while the data items (C) and
(G) will be added to DI L, and this will be the case for all attacking transactions that belong
to (MT L).
The algorithm will take the next transaction in the log file, which is T2 . Since T2 is
an updating transaction, it will be added into the DA Table. Consequently, every reading
operation in T2 will be examined to ascertain if it reads any damaged data item from the
DI L; if so, the data item will be added to the invalid read column, as apparent with (G).
Otherwise, it will be added as a pair with its value to the valid read column as (B, 4) in
our example. The next transaction is T3 , as we notice that Fog2 has read the data item
(G), which is a damaged data item. Steps 9-16 will examine that and mark it in the fog
ID column. Also, it will create a new damage item table for Fog2 (DIT Fog2 ) and add it to
the table with the transaction ID and the timestamp of the transaction when it has been
committed (see Table 4.3). Steps (28-30) of the algorithm will find that the damaged data
items (A) and (G) have been refreshed in T4 because they updated without reading any
other damaged data items. Therefore, they will be added along with their new values in the
data that were written and removed from the DI L. The process continues until the end of
the log. Then, the DIT Fog2 will be sent to Fog2 to be used as input for Algorithm 2, while
the DA Table and DI L will be sent to Algorithm 3, which is the main recovery algorithm.
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Once Fog2 receives the DIT Fog2 , it will launch Algorithm 2 and use DIT Fog2 as
input to do further assessment and detection. Note that this table will add any damaged
data items that are detected in Fog2 , as shown in Table 4.6. Thus, a new damage audit table
DA Table will be created and initialized to null. It will scan the local log of Fog2 , starting
from the first a↵ected transaction on the DIT Fog2 , which is T9 in our example. Therefore,
T9 will be added to the new DA Table and for every read operation, the data item will be
examined to find out if it belongs to the DA Table; if so, it will be added to the invalid
read column. Otherwise, it will be added to the valid read column along with its value.
Therefore, the data item (fog1 .T3 .G) will be added to the invalid read, while the pair (K, 3)
will be added to the valid read column (see Table 4.4). However, it will do the same thing
for the write operations as in Algorithm 1, so the updated data item (K) along with its value
(K, 12) will be added to the data written column. Meanwhile, the data item (K) will be
added with its timestamp into the DIT Fog2 , as can be seen in Table 4.6, since it becomes
a↵ected by reading the damaged data item (Fog1 .T3 .G). For T10 , the updating occurs after
reading the damaged data item (K), and the access time of T10 for that data item (K) comes
after the timestamp of the damage data item in the DIT Fog2 , so the scenario (the same
as shown in T2 in Fog1 ) will be repeated, as shown in Table 4.4. Note that examining the
timestamp of reading the damage data item is important in Algorithm 2 since Fog2 may
read the same data item twice from Fog1 , once before it became damaged and once after
that, so any item accessed before the damage must be valid. Also, the damaged data item
may be refreshed after it has been read by Fog2 . Therefore, the only way to determine the
status is to compare the committed times. Consequently, the process continues until the
end of the log. By the end, there will be two tables, the DA Table for fog2 , which will be
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sent to Algorithm 4 to conduct the data recovery, and the new damage item table for Fogx
(DIT Fogx ) (Table 4.5), which will be sent to Fogx to be used as an input for Algorithm 2
to do further detection. Once Fogx receives the DIT Fogx , the same process as we discussed
previously will be continued until the end of the log of Fogx (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8).
As soon as Fog1 has done the damage assessment algorithm (Algorithm 1) and sent
the DA Table and DI L to Algorithm 3 to do the data recovery, which will be launched
immediately, and taken the DA Table and DI L as inputs, it will scan the DA Table from
the start and search for any transactions that read invalid data items. For example, T2 reads
invalid data item (G), and then the algorithm will look for the last valid update value of
(G), which must be the closest transaction before the T2 . Therefore, T1 has to have the
latest updated correct value of (G), which is (3). Therefore, the pair (G, 3) will be copied to
the valid read column, and (G) will be removed from the invalid read column. After that,
T2 will be recalculated using the new values, as apparent in Table 4.9. Note that in this
example, only the addition operation will be used for simplicity; therefore, we consider that
for any transaction where a write operation is found after read operations, all the values of
the read operations will be added together. After that, the T3 will be taken, so it will do
the same process. Additionally, it will find that Fog2 has read the damage data item (G).
Hence, a new valid data item table for Fog2 (VIT Fog2 ) will be created and added to the
transaction ID, which is T3 and the correct value of (G), which is (G, 3) (see Table 4.10),
and so on until the end of the DA Table. After that, VIT Fog2 will be sent to Fog2 to be
used as an input in the Algorithm 4 to recover the data.
Once Fog2 receives the VIT Fog2 , it will launch Algorithm 4 and use VIT Fog2 along
with it is own DA Table to do data recovery. Then, every record in the DA Table will be
84

checked. Since the first record (T9 in our example) must be an a↵ected transaction from
Fog1 , then VIT Fog2 should have the correct and valid value of the damaged data item.
Therefore, the new value of data item (G) will be copied from VIT Fog2 to the valid read
column of the DA Table and remove it from invalid read. After that, T9 will be recalculated
using the new values (as shown in Table 4.11). The rest of the algorithm will be the same
as Algorithm 3, and the same thing will be done in Fogx after it receives the VIT Fogx from
Fog2 (see Tables 4.12 and 4.13).
Table 4.2: The Damage Audit Table for Fog1
T Id
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T9
T10
T11

Data written
(C, 11), (G, 3)
(A, 13), (D, 13)
(A, 5), (G, 3)
(D, 27)
(D, 20), (A, 25)
(C, 11)
(E, 36)

Valid read

Invalid

Fog ID

(B, 4)

G
G

Fog2

C, D
D
D

Fog2

A
E

Fog2

(A, 5)
(B, 4), (A, 5)

(C, 11)

Table 4.3: Fog2 Damage Item Table Created by Fog1
Transaction Id
fog1 .T3
fog1 .T7
fog1 .T11

Damaged Data Items
G
D
E

Timestamp
9:00:00 AM
9:00:30 AM
9:01:00 AM
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Table 4.4: The Damage Audit Table for fog2
T Id
T9
T10
T11
T14
T16
T17

Data written
(K, 12)
(M, 22)

Valid read
(K, 3)
(M, 10)

(N, 24)
(P, 36)

(L, 4)

Invalid
fog1 .T3 .G
K
M
fog1 .T7 .D
fog1 .T11 .E
P

Fog ID

Fogx

Fogx

Table 4.5: Fogx Damage Item Table Created by Fog2
Transaction Id
fog2 .T11
fog2 .T17

Damaged Data Items
M
P

Timestamp
9:00:20 AM
9:01:05 AM

Table 4.6: DIT Fog2 with all damaged data items that are found on Fog2
Transaction Id
fog1 .T3
fog1 .T7
fog1 .T11
T9
T10
T14
T16

Damaged Data Items
G
D
E
K
M
N
P

Timestamp
9:00:00 AM
9:00:30 AM
9:01:00 AM
9:00:00 AM
9:00:17 AM
9:00:30 AM
9:01:00 AM

Table 4.7: The Damage Audit Table for fogx
T Id
T9
T11
T12

Data Written
(I,32)
(Q,54)
(R,66)

Valid Read
(H,10)
(J,18)
(U,12)

Invalid
fog2 .T11 .M
fog2 .T17 .P
Q

fogID

Table 4.8: DIT Fogx with all damaged data items that are found on Fogx
Transaction Id
fog2 .T11
fog2 .T17
T9
T11
T12

Damaged Data Items
M
P
I
Q
R

Timestamp
9:00:20 AM
9:01:05 AM
9:00:20 AM
9:01:08 AM
9:01:10 AM
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Table 4.9: DA Table for fog1 after damaged data have been recovered
T Id
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T9
T10
T11

Data written
(C, 11), (G, 3)
(A, 7), (D, 7)
(A, 5), (G, 3)
(D, 23)
(D, 27), (A, 32)
(C, 11)
(E, 43)

Valid read

Invalid

Fog ID

(B, 4), (G, 3)
(G, 3)

Fog2

(A,5), (C, 11), (D, 7)
(B, 4), (A, 5), (D, 23)
(D, 27)

Fog2

(C, 11), (A, 32)
(E, 43)

Fog2

Table 4.10: VIT Fogx sent from fog1
Transaction Id
fog1 .T3
fog1 .T7
fog1 .T11

Valid Data Items
(G,3)
(D,27)
(E,43)

Table 4.11: DA Table for fog2 after damaged data have been recovered
T Id
T9
T10
T11
T14
T16
T17

Data Written
(K, 6)
(M, 16)
(N, 31)
(P, 43)

Valid Read
(K,3), (fog1 .T3 .G, 3)
(M, 10), (K, 6)
(M, 16)
(L, 4), (fog1 .T7 .D, 27)
(fog1 .T11 .E, 43)
(P, 43)

Invalid

fogID

Fogx

Fogx

Table 4.12: VIT Fogx sent from fog2
Transaction Id
fog2 .T11
fog1 .T17

Valid Data Items
(M,16)
(P,43)
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Table 4.13: DA Table for fogx after damaged data have been recovered
T Id
T9
T11
T12
4.8

Data Written
(I, 26)
(Q, 61)
(R, 73)

Valid Read
(H, 3), (fog2 .T11 .M, 16)
(J, 18), (fog2 .T17 .P, 43)
(U, 12), (Q, 61)

Invalid

fogID

Experiments and Evaluation
In section 3.6 in chapter 3, we explained the experimental setup, the simulation

environment, and datasets that have been used in detail.

4.8.1

Evaluation of the Second Model: Ensuring Integrity in Smart City Model
This model proposes the use of fog computing in smart cities to manage utility service

companies and consumer data. We also propose a novel technique to assess damage to data
caused by a malicious attack. The original data can then be recovered, and the database
returned to a consistent state as though no attack has occurred. This experiment aimed to
analyze the behavior of the proposed damage assessment algorithm as it detected a↵ected
data items with varying factors designed for the experiment. As declared in the simulation
section, di↵erent sets of log files were produced. Each set represented the number of fog nodes
in the system with a di↵erent number of transactions in the log files. In this experiment we
started with a fixed number of fog nodes each time and a di↵erent number of transactions
in each log file. Each time a malicious transaction was arbitrarily injected, the results were
categorized into di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions: a set of 20 to 25 a↵ected transactions,
a second set of 10 to 15 identified, a↵ected transactions, and a third set of less than five
identified, a↵ected transactions. The clustering of the a↵ected transactions was necessary
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in evaluating the proposed algorithms as they are impacted by other factors, such as the
number of fog nodes and the number of transactions in each log file.
Each transaction in each set was repeated approximately twenty times. Then the total
time, from insertion of the malicious transaction until all damage audit tables for all a↵ected
transactions were built, was computed. Then the average for each set to identify the damaged
data items was calculated. Also, the total time from receipt of the damage audit table for
the proposed data recovery algorithms to recover all a↵ected data items was computed.
Then the time required for each set for the recovery process was averaged. This average was
calculated for use in investigating and evaluating our approach. We compared the results,
determining the factor or factors having a greater or lesser impact to the algorithms.

4.8.1.1

First Experiment: The impact of log file size on di↵erent number of fog
nodes

The relationship between the number of transactions in each log file, the number of
a↵ected transactions, and the average time required by our system to build all damage audit
tables for all a↵ected data items in the whole system were plotted on Figs. 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and
4.5. The average time was calculated by averaging the detection time each set required to
complete the tasks. The results show that a log file of 100 transactions will take the system
approximately 60 to 120 ms to detect all a↵ected data items in the whole system no matter
the number of a↵ected transactions. Also, the figures demonstrate that the delay time for
the log files of 100 transactions increased by 15 to 20 ms from the set of less than five a↵ected
transactions to the set of 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions. And the delay time the log files of
100 transactions increased by 20 to 40 ms from the set of 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions to
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the set of 20 to 25 a↵ected transactions.
The time required to detect all a↵ected data items and create the audit tables for
all a↵ected transactions in the whole system with log files of 500 and 1000 transactions was
increased from the log files of 100 transactions for all di↵erent sets. Therefore, the time
needed for the system to identify all a↵ected data items in log files of 500 transactions was
about 165 to 185 ms for the set of less than five a↵ected transactions. The time required for
the same processes increased by an average of 26 ms for the set of 10-15 a↵ected transactions
and by an average of 76 ms from the set of 10 -15 a↵ected transactions to the set of 20 to 25
a↵ected transactions. Additionally, the delay time for the system to complete the damage
assessment algorithms in log files of 1000 transactions was roughly 190 ms for the set of less
than five a↵ected transactions. Then it increased by an average of 130 ms for the set of 10-15
a↵ected transactions which was the greatest shifting in all results. Nonetheless, it increased
a bit, by an average of 26 ms, from the set of 10 -15 a↵ected transactions to the set of 20 to
25 a↵ected transactions. This increase in delay time is related to the number of transactions
in the log file, the position of the malicious transaction in the log file, and the number of fog
nodes infected. For instance, Fig. 4.5 notes that the average delay time for the set of 10-15
a↵ected transactions on 20 fog nodes with 500 log file transactions is considerably greater
than its counterpart in the other groups of fog nodes. Analysis of the results found that
the malicious transactions were randomly inserted in this particular set to the beginning
of the log files, leading to many more a↵ected fog nodes which, in turn, led to this delay.
Therefore, it follows that the main reasons for the delay results in the other experiments are
determined by the variables introduced: the number of a↵ected fog nodes, or the location
of the malicious transactions in the log file(s), or the number of a↵ected transactions. The
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latter of which will impact system availability.
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Figure 4.2: The impact of log file size on five fog nodes in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.3: The impact of log file size on ten fog nodes in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.4: The impact of log file size on fifteen fog nodes in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.5: The impact of log file size on twenty fog nodes in the smart city model.
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4.8.1.2

Second Experiment: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and
sets of a↵ected transactions on log files with di↵erent log files size

This experiment was designed to study the impact of a variable number of fog nodes
on our damage assessment algorithm. Hence, the relationship between the number of fog
nodes and the sets of a↵ected transactions have been illuminated in this experiment. The
experiment was conducted each time with log file sizes fixed to sets of 100 transactions,
then to 500 transactions, then to 1000 transactions. Figs. 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 illustrate steady
performance by the proposed damage assessment algorithms with the set of less than five
a↵ected transactions regardless of log file size.
However, the time the damage assessment algorithm needed to complete its tasks increased when the number of fog nodes increased with the sets of 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions
and 20 to 25 a↵ected transactions. This held true regardless of log file size. The increase
in latency occurred here as the rising number of fog nodes on the system gave way to the
chance of a greater number of infected fog nodes, especially with many a↵ected transactions.
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Figure 4.6: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 100 T in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.7: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 500 T in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.8: The impact of a variable number of fog nodes and sets of a↵ected transactions
on log files of 1000 T in the smart city model.

4.8.1.3

Third Experiment “The Evaluation of the Proposed Data Recovery Algorithms”

This experiment measures the performance of our proposed data recovery algorithms
in regaining all damaged data items and restoring their correct values as if no attack occurred.
For each a↵ected fog node, we calculated the time required, once the damage audit table and
damage item list has been received, for our proposed data recovery algorithms to recover
and render all the a↵ected data items to a consistent state. Then the average time for each
set of a↵ected transactions that we mentioned in Experiments 4.8.1 was computed. The
following Figs. 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. show the relationship between di↵erent numbers
of transactions on each log file and variable sets of a↵ected transactions with a fixed number
of fog nodes.
Overall, we notice that the essential time to recover all damaged data items in the
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whole system necessitates no more than 2.8 ms in all cases with all di↵erent numbers of fog
nodes, sets of a↵ected transactions, and sizes of log files. The set of less than five a↵ected
transactions needs approximately 1.1 to 1.5 ms to recover all data items regardless of the
number of fog nodes and the log file size; the other two sets took 0.09 to 0.96 ms more time.
Hence, during this time the a↵ected data items will be unavailable for use. It is impacted by
the number of a↵ected transactions in the system and holds true regardless of the number
of fog nodes or the number of transactions in each log file.

5 Fog Nodes
2.5000

Average Delay (ms)

2.0000

2.0633

2.0357

2.1624
1.9671

1.8250

1.5000
1.0000

1.5476
1.2867

1.6592

1.2091

0.5000
0.0000
LESS THAN 5

10 -15

20 -25

Number of Affected Transactions
100 T

500 T

1000 T

Figure 4.9: The impact of log file size on five fog nodes in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.10: The impact of log file size on ten fog nodes in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.11: The impact of log file size on fifteen fog nodes in the smart city model.
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Figure 4.12: The impact of log file size on twenty fog nodes in the smart city model.
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5

Ensuring Data Integrity in Fog Nodes Distribution in Intelligent

Government Model
Some of the following paragraphs, figures, and algorithms that will be introduced in
this chapter have been already published in our work [64, 81] as shown in the publications
and reprint permissions chapter 7.

5.1

Introduction
In this era of technological evolution, many technologies, including the Internet of

Things (IoT), wearable devices, smart buildings, video gaming and streaming, and smartphones, are an integral part of daily human life. Building stable and reliable infrastructure
for IoT systems necessitates consideration of rapid growth in the number of connected IoT
devices. It is estimated that these devices will number approximately 75 billion by 2025
[1] and generate more than 79 zettabytes of data daily [2]. The present cloud and internet
architecture face significant challenges in handling and managing this massive amount of
data [5].
Another challenge present cloud and internet architecture faces is the provision of
adequate security and privacy measures for end users’ sensitive data. Government data is
of particular concern as attack on data within a government system may place a nation at
risk [25]. Sensitive applications such as traffic control systems, Real-Time Surveillance Camera Monitoring, and Video-conference applications require real-time processing and location
awareness.
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To overcome the limitations of cloud computing, fog computing, as a new platform,
was introduced by Cisco Systems in January, 2014. Fog computing is a virtualization architecture in which vital computing resources are re-located close to the data source and
the end-user. Fog computing is able to process massive amounts of data, extend cloud storage, and o↵ers rapid local responses [7]. Fog computing services make it a very satisfactory
and practical design solution for many sensitive applications that require real-time, location
awareness, including those systems on every level of government. Fog computing strengthens
privacy and security of data as data is stored and computed close to end-users at the edge
of the network [6, 9].
Governments around the world are creating intelligent environment systems that will
improve the quality of services they provide and the living conditions of their citizens. By
utilizing fog computing technology, they will be able to capture and utilize maximum benefit
of their systems and provide a safe environment with high-quality services. However, these
technologies do not come without risks. One of the most crucial issues in fog computing
is preserving the security and privacy of consumer data. While several researchers have
attempted to address security issues in intelligent government systems [82], there remain
some issues in need of more attention, including that of assessing damage to data that su↵er
malicious attacks.
Data damage assessment and recovery are fundamental to creating secure and reliable
databases. This is particularly true for a government data environment where the transmission of time-critical sensitive data is commonplace. If one considers, for example, traffic control systems, Real-Time Surveillance Camera Monitoring applications, as mentioned earlier,
any attack on these systems will paralyze their vital functions such as real-time processing
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and location awareness features. When an attack on these critical databases violate integrity
of stored data the incident will result in serious consequences including damage to property
and even loss of life. Therefore, in addition to development of appropriate mechanisms for
adaptation of fog computing in intelligent systems, meeting security requirements to respond
to attacks by providing fast and accurate damage assessment and recovery techniques are
absolutely necessary.
Thus the primary objectives of this section are twofold: propose a novel model design
for an intelligent government system using fog computing technology to control and manage
the data across the entire system and propose a unique scheme to detect and assess data
a↵ected by malicious attacks in the model system.

5.2

Model
This section proposes using a unique distributed fog computing architecture to de-

velop an intelligent county government system for managing important data. It also presents
a cooperative technique for identifying and assessing damaged and a↵ected data following
an attack. In the proposed model, the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is responsible for
detecting malicious transactions in the system and providing a copy of those transactions to
the damage-assessment algorithms. Each fog node in the proposed architecture must have
its own log file and is required to use a strict serializable history. The log files must be
secured such that they cannot be modified by unauthorized individuals.

5.3

Model Notation
A description of the notations to be used in our model can be found in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Notation used in our model
Notation
sub-system
pr fog
tsnt fog
S{pr fogID .TM }
G(Tn , E)

A↵-Lfogn
wi (A, v1 , v2 )

ri (A, v)
ci

5.4

Description
Distributed fog nodes sub-system representing each authority/government agency.
Primary fog data service node on the sub-system.
Transient fog nodes responsible for collecting data by using
smart devices from end users across the county.
The set of detected malicious transactions in the system
detected by IDS.
Graph Representation where Tn denotes the maximum
number of transactions in the node and E denotes the number of edges
A↵ected-transactions list containing all a↵ected transactions identified by proposed damage assessment algorithms.
The write operation of the transaction Ti ; v1 is the before
image, which represents the value of the data item A before
updating. And v2 is the after image, which is the value of
data item A after it is updated.
The read operation of transaction Ti where A is the data
item and v is the current value of A.
The transaction Ti has been committed, which means it is
successfully completed and will be recorded to the database.

The Proposed Architecture
Generally, there are two main types of fog computing technology, public fog comput-

ing, and private fog computing. Any distributed fog computing network to which access
is limited and restricted for use only by specific parties shall be a private fog computing
network. A great example of a private fog computing network is the campus fog computing
distribution such as school or college, and government fog computing distribution as what
we will have here in this chapter as an example [83].
In this proposed model, each government agency operates its own fog nodes subsystem. Each sub-system has at least one primary fog-data-service node (pr fog) and multiple transient-fog nodes (tsnt fog), which are well distributed to ensure quality of service
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throughout the county. Some sub-systems may have restricted access to other sub-systems.
The tsnt fog are responsible for collecting data using IoT and smart devices, security
surveillance cameras, and kiosk stations from end-users across the county. Then the data is
transferred to the pr fog based on several factors, including location and selective data access
restrictions. Each pr fog in the system is able to perform some imperative operations such
as calculation and aggregation of required data. These operations are necessary to optimize
the bandwidth of networks since the data sent through it are aggregated by force. The
aggregation of essential data increases privacy and security because most of the data is now
processed locally at the edge of the network; local processing minimizes the transmission of
sensitive data over the network.
For example, the police department has one pr fog and several tsnt fogs that are
responsible for controlling and managing traffic lights, while other tsnt fogs are responsible
for collecting data from security cameras and so on. All data collected by traffic-light sensors
and surveillance cameras are transferred through tsnt fogs to the police-department pr fog.
Likewise, certain other pr fogs in the system, such as the fire department’s pr fog, have
restricted access to the data collected by traffic-lights sensors; the fire department’s access
allows emergency vehicles to change traffic lights and admission to the least congested routes.
As we stated early this model is a private distributed fog computing network so, It is
assumed that the whole system can be trusted because it is operated and surveilled by the
government. However, there is one trusted fog node in the system managing security matters
such as key management and distribution. It is located at the center of the system, ensuring
a reliable connection to all subsystems and providing a secondary pathway in the event a
pr fog is disconnected. The trusted fog node plays a leading role in damage assessment and
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data recovery process (Fig. 5.5).

Figure 5.1: The Proposed Architecture.

5.5

The Proposed Damage Assessment Algorithms
This model implements a transaction-dependency graph to observe and monitor all

transactions in the entire system. Transaction-dependency graphs allow quick detection of
all transactions a↵ected by a malicious transaction. Transaction dependency is used instead
of a complicated data dependency where transaction updates are difficult to track and graphs
are sparser and more isolated. A transaction-dependency graph is easier to build and capable
of detecting and blocking malicious transactions significantly faster, thus preventing further
damage to data in the system. Una↵ected data items are available for immediate use. The
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following subsections explain in detail each step of the proposed model.

5.5.1

Algorithm 5.1: Building Local Graphs
Each primary fog-data-service node pr fog builds a directed graph based on transaction-

dependency relationships between transactions that have been successfully committed to its
database. The graph is produced and stored in a separate, unmodifiable file with the original
transactions in the same directory of the log file.
Each pr fog generates a graph by building a two-row matrix. The first row contains
associated data items and the second row contains the last transaction that updated each
of those data items (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). When a new transaction Ti is committed to the
database, the matrix is scanned to determine Ti ’s precursors (parents). The new transaction
is added as a new vertex to the graph and the edges between Ti and its parents are inserted
based on those dependencies. Coincidentally, the matrix is updated with the newly committed transaction. So, for each write operation for data item X in Ti , the algorithm will scan
the matrix and update the last transaction for data item X to Ti . However, if data item X
does not exist in the matrix, it will insert that data item and the transaction identification
Ti as a new record.
For example, consider the following log records for pr fogx and pr fogy :
pr fogx : r1 (A, 45 ) r1 (B, 34 ) w1 (C, 29, 80 ) w1 (G, 23, 18 ) r2 (B, 34 ) c1 w2 (A, 45, 48 ) w2 (D,
12, 35 ) c2 r3 (G, 18 ) c3 w4 (A, 48, 69 ) w4 (G, 18, 24 ) c4 r5 (D, 35 ) r5 (A, 69 ) w5 (D, 35, 98 )
c5 r6 (B, 34 ) w6 (B, 34, 63 ) r6 (D, 98 ) w6 (D, 98, 24 ) r6 (A, 69 ) w6 (A, 69, 78 ) c6 r7 (D, 24 )
c7 r8 (C, 80)c8 r9 (fogy .T6 .V, 56) w9 (C, 80, 93) c9 r10 (A, 78 ) r10 (C, 93 ) w10 (E, 39, 66 )c10
r11 (E, 66 ) c11 .
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Figure 5.2: Described Local Dependency Graphs for pr fogx .

T1
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T5

T4

T6

Figure 5.3: Described Local Dependency Graphs for pr fogy .

pr fogy : r1 (K, 58) r1 (fogx .T4 .G, 24 )w1 (K, 58, 98 )c1 r2 (M, 39 ) r2 (K, 98 )w2 (M, 39, 59 )c2
r3 (R, 43 )c3 r4 (fogx .T5 .D, 35 ) r4 (M, 59 ) w4 (N, 36, 84 ) c4 r5 (K, 98 ) w5 (P, 43, 78 )c5 w6 (V,
56) c6
The log records for pr fogx indicate that T6 read data items B, D, and A. After T6
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Algorithm 5.1 Building Local Graphs
1: Create a new Hash-table H and Initialize to null
2: Create a new Graph Representation G = (Tn , E) and Initialize to null
3: When Ti is committed in the local DB then
4: for each operation O 2 Ti do
5: if O is wi (A, v1, v2) then
6:
add a pair (A, Ti ID) to H
7:
add Ti as a new vertex to G if it does not exist
8: else if O is ri (A, v) then
9:
if A 2 H then
10:
add Ti as a new vertex to G if it does not exist
11:
acquire the parents Tj ID from H
12:
add edge from Tj to Ti
13:
else if A 2 foreign fog node then
14:
call global graph algorithm (Algorithm 5.2)
15:
end if
16: else if O is ci then
17: end if
18: end for=0
is committed, it is added as a new vertex to the local graph of pr fogx , and the directeddependency edge (the link) between T6 and other transactions on the graph is drawn based
on T6 ’s dependency relationships.
The algorithm locates the last updated transactions in the matrix for data items B,
D, and A (Table 5.2). The algorithm finds that T4 is the last transaction that updated
data item A and T5 last updated data item D. B does not exist in the matrix and so it
has not been modified. A directed edge is now drawn from T4 to T6 and from T5 to T6
(Figure 5.3). The matrix is simultaneously updated. A new record for data item B is
inserted and associated with T6 as the last transaction to update B. In addition, the last
updating transactions associated with data items A and D are updated to T6 as shown on
table 5.3.
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Table 5.2: Matrix Tracking the Last Updated Transactions After T5 is committed
Data Items
Last updated T

C
T1

G
T4

A
T4

D
T5

Table 5.3: Matrix Tracking the Last Updated Transactions After T1 0 is committed
Data Items
Last updated T

5.5.2

C
T9

G
T4

A
T6

D
T6

B
T6

E
T10

Algorithm 5.2: Building Global Graphs on the Trust Fog Node
As the trusted fog node plays an essential role in managing security and protection

considerations, including damage assessment and data recovery, the node obtains global
graphs for any transaction that accessed a data item in a pr fog node in the system.
Here is an example:
• Ti belonging to pr fogy accesses data item A. The last transaction updating data item
A was Tj on pr fogx .
• A copy of that last transaction’s graph updating data item A is sent to the global
graph on the trusted fog node and includes all preceding vertices that could a↵ect Tj
directly or indirectly.
• Transaction Ti is added to the global graph as a new child of Tj and an edge is drawn
from transaction x.Tj to y.Ti .
• Transaction Ti from pr fogy continues updating the global graph on the trusted fog
node by sending a copy of every subsequent transaction committed locally at pr fogy
(successor of Ti ). This copy will be updated and sent frequently.
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FogxT1
FogyT6

FogxT2
FogxT9

FogxT4

FogyT1

FogxT5
FogxT10

FogyT5

FogyT2

FogyT4

FogxT11

Figure 5.4: The Global Graph on The Trusted Node.

Figure 5.4, shows an example of the global graph generated using transaction activities
at the trusted fog node from pr fogx and pr fogy . As seen in the log records of pr fogy T1
read data item G, which was updated by T4 in the log records of pr fogx . Then T4 , pr fogx
graph and all its preceding elements are sent to the trusted fog node. This means any vertex
that is a precursor of T4 are now stored in the trusted fog node. In this case, T4 is the only
Algorithm 5.2 Building Global Graphs on the Trusted Fog Node
1: Create a new Global Graph Representation Gg = (Tn , E) on trusted fog node and
Initialize to null
2: (When Ti 2 fogx reads data item A 2 fogy ) then
3: for each ri (A, v) 2 Ti do
4: acquire all predecessors of Tj from Gy
5: add Ti as a new vertex to Gg if it does not exist
6: add edge from fogy .Tj to fogx .Ti
7: end for
8: (When a new transaction Tz 2 pr fogx is committed where Tz is successor of Ti ) then
9: add Tz as a new vertex to Gg if it does not exist
10: add edge from Ti to Tz
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vertex since it does not have parents. In addition, once T1 from pr fogy is committed, it is
added to both the global graph on the trusted fog node and the local pr fogy graph.
All new transactions added to the local graph of pr fogy and the successor of T1 are
added to the global graph. Thus:
• In the log records of pr fogy , T2 reads data item K from T1 . T2 is added as a new
vertex in the local pr fogy graph.
• An edge is drawn from T1 to T2 . The global graph is subsequently updated by adding
T2 .
• And so, it continues: T4 reads item M from T2 and T5 reads item K from T1 . Hence,
T4 and T5 are added as new vertices to the local pr fogy graph. Edges are drawn from
T2 to T4 and from T1 to T5 . Then T4 and T5 are added to the global graph. The
pr fogy will continue sending updated copies of T1 ’s successor to the global graph upon
commit operating at its local database. This copy, as indicated, is updated and sent
frequently.
To prevent the global graph from becoming excessively large, a threshold is set based
on the system’s hardware capabilities. When the number of transactions in each fog node
reaches that threshold, the global graph is removed to the cloud for permanent storage.

5.5.3

Algorithm 5.3: Damage Assessment Algorithms
Once the IDS detects a malicious transaction in the system, it sends it to the trusted

fog node for identifying all transactions dependent on, and therefore a↵ected by, the malicious
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transaction. Simultaneously, each victimized primary fog pr fog data service node in the
system receives the malicious transaction(s) detected on its database.
The pr fog can scan its own graphs and detect a↵ected transactions. This feature is
necessary as some local graphs containing transactions, malicious or not, have never been
accessed or read by another fog node. Those transactions have not been forwarded to the
trusted fog node. The pr fog scans only the graphs that it possesses using a modified Depth
First Search (MDFS) algorithm, beginning with the malicious transaction received from the
IDS.
Immediately following this part of the damage-assessment process, each subsystem
receives a list of all a↵ected transactions detected on its local database. All data items
updated by those transactions, hence considered damaged, are blocked from being accessed
until recovered. The rest of the data items are made available to users.
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Algorithm 5.3 Damage Assessment Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
5.6

Once S{pr fogID .TM } is received from IDS
Classify S{pr fogID .TM } to multi-set {S1 {pr fog1 .TM }..Sn {pr fogn .TM }}
Send each subset Sn {pr fogn .TM } to the (pr fogn )
Send S{pr fogID .TM } to the trust fog node.
For the trust fog node and each other pr fogn that receive S or Sn .
MDFS (Gn , TM 1 )
Create a new a↵ected-transactions list A↵-Lfogn and Initialize to null
Create a new Stack tranS and Initialize to null
add TM 1 to tranS
mark TM 1 as visited
while tranS is not empty do
TM 1 = tranS.pop
add TM 1 to A↵-Lfogn
for each child Ti of TM 1 in Gn do
if Ti is not in then A↵-Lfogn
add Ti to tranS
mark Ti as visited and add it to A↵-Lfogn
end if
end for
end while
Applying the Transaction-Dependency Graph Scheme to public distributed
fog computing network
The implementation of the transaction-dependency graph scheme can also be applied

to the previous model architecture; the architecture for the use of a distributed fog node
system in smart cities to manage the consumer data of utility services. As we observed, this
model lacks the availability of a trusted fog node to build global graphs and handle security
matters such as damage assessment and data recovery. This model has only public fog nodes
distribution and belongs to more than one owner. No trusted fog node can exist in this kind
of distribution.
However, we can still modify our transaction-dependency graph scheme to enable
observation and monitoring of all transactions in the entire system of a model lacking a
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trusted fog node. As we mentioned in section 4.2, Ensuring Integrity in Smart City Models, each fog node in the proposed architecture must have its own log file and use a strict
serializable history and the graphs produced must be stored in a separate, unmodifiable file
with the original transactions in the same log file directory. These three assumptions remain
compulsory for building local graphs for each fog node.

5.6.1

Algorithm 5.4: Building Local Graphs for public distributed fog nodes
Each public fog node (pub fog) or private fog node for a utility service company

(usc fog) builds a directed graph based on transaction dependency relationships between
transactions that have been successfully committed to its database. However, When a new
transaction (Tx ) is committed to the database, the algorithm will determine Tx ’s dependency
(parents). Tx will then be inserted as a new vertex to the local graph, and the links between
Tx and its parents will be added on the basis of the dependencies. The fog node will update
the tracking mechanism in accordance with the recently committed transaction.
To illustrate the algorithm, we use the following example for the records of log for
pr fog1 and pub fog2 fog nodes:
pr fog1 : r1 (X, 32 ) w1 (Z, 29, 80 ) w1 (W, 89, 81 ) c1 r2 (Z, 80 ) w2 (X, 32, 22 ) w2 (D,
12, 35 ) c2 r3 (W, 81 ) r3( pub fog2 .T2 .F, 66) w3 (W, 81, 91 ) c3 w4 (X, 22, 77 ) c4 r5 (D, 35 ) r5 (
X, 77 ) w5 (D, 35, 98 ) c5 r6 (D, 98 ) w6 (D, 98, 24 ) r6 (X, 77 ) w6 (X, 77, 78 ) c6
pub fog2 : r1 (E, 13) r1 (pr fog1 .T1 .W, 81 ) w1 ( E, 13, 39 ) c1 r2 (F, 53 ) r2 (E, 39 ) w2 (
F, 53, 66 ) c2 r3 (R, 43 ) c3 r4 (pr fog1 .T5 .D, 98 ) r4 (F, 66 ) w4 (J, 79, 30 ) c4 r5 (E, 39 ) w5 (I,
43, 78 ) c5
The log record for pr fog1 indicates that T5 reads data items (D) and (X). Conse113

Figure 5.5: The Proposed Architecture.
quently, after T5 is committed, it will be added as a new vertex to the local graph of pr fog1 ,
and the directed dependency edge between T5 and other transactions on the graph will be
added on the basis of T5 dependency relationships. The algorithm will determine that the
last updated transaction for data item (X) is T4 and the last transaction that updates data
item (D) is T2 . Hence, a directed edge will be drawn from T4 to T5 and from T2 to T5
(Figure 5.6 ).
However, when any transaction Ti reads a data item in one pub fog / pr fog node that
has been updated by Tj in another pub fog / pr fog node, then the transaction identification
(ID) of Ti will be added as a child of Tj on the local graph of the pub fog / pr fog node, in
which the item is initially updated. For example, in the log records of pub fog2 , T1 reads
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Algorithm 5.4 Building Local Graphs for Public Distributed Fog Computing
1: Create a new Hash-table H and Initialize to null
2: Create a new Graph Representation G = (Tn , E) and Initialize to null
3: When Ti is committed in the local DB then
4: for each operation O 2 Ti do
5: if O is wi (A, v1, v2) then
6:
add a pair (A, Ti ID) to H
7:
add Ti as a new vertex to G if it does not exist
8: else if O is ri (A, v) && A 2 H then
9:
add Ti as a new vertex to G if it does not exist
10:
acquire the parents Tj ID from H
11:
add edge from Tj to Ti
12: else if Tk 2 foreign fog node fogy reads data item A that updated by Ti then
13:
add fogy .Tk as a new vertex to G if it does not exist
14:
add edge from Ti to fogy .Tk
15: end if
16: end for
data item W that is updated by T1 in the log records of pr fog1 . The transaction ID of T1
from pub fog2 will then be added as a foreign child of T1 on the local graph of pr fog1 . T4
from the log of pub fog2 reads item D that is written by T5 on pr fog1 , and the transaction
ID of T4 from pub fog2 will be added as a foreign child of T5 on the local graph of pr fog1 .
Data item F is updated by T2 on pub fog2 and accessed by T3 from pr fog1 . Accordingly, T3 will be added as a foreign child of T2 on the local graph of pub fog2 . The process
continues updating local graphs, given that transactions are successfully committed to the
local database. Figure 5.6 shows examples of the local graphs generated using transaction
activities at pr fog1 and pub fog2 .
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T2

pr1.T3

T5

T4

Figure 5.6: Described Local Dependency Graphs for pr fog1 and pub fog2 .

5.6.2

Algorithm 5.5: Damage Assessment Algorithms for Public Distributed
Fog Computing
Once the IDS detects a malicious transaction in the system, each fog node, pr fog

or pub fog is informed of the malicious transaction(s) detected on its database. The pr fog
or pub fog scrutinizes its own graphs and identifies a↵ected transactions. The compromised
fog nodes examine only the graphs that they possess using a modified Depth First Search
algorithm (MDFS), beginning with the first malicious transaction received from the IDS. All
successors of the malicious transaction will be considered a↵ected transactions and added
to the a↵ected list. However, if the transaction Ti from pub fog2 is found to be a successor
of the initial malicious transaction Tj on the pr fog1 , then a sub-list of a↵ected transaction
will be sent to pub fog2 and used as input to the damage assessment algorithm. The process
will continue until all a↵ected transactions in the system have been identified.
Soon after this phase of the damage assessment mechanism is accomplished each fog
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Algorithm 5.5 Damage Assessment Algorithm for Public Distributed Fog Computing
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:

Once S{fogID .TM } is received from IDS
Assort S{fogID .TM } to multi-set S1 ... Sn
Send Sx {fogx .TM } to the (fogx )
For each fogx that receive Sx
MDFS (Gn , TM 1 )
Establish a new list for a↵ected transactions (A↵-Lfogx )
Establish a new Stack ST
add TM 1 to ST
mark TM 1 as visited
while ST is not empty do
TM 1 = ST .pop
add TM 1 to A↵-Lfogx
for each child Ti of TM 1 in Gn do
if Ti 2
/ A↵-Lfogx then
add Ti to ST
mark Ti as visited
add Ti to A↵-Lfogx
if Ti is foreign transaction 2 fogy then
add Ti to sub-list A↵-Lfogx,y
end if
end if
end for
end while
Send A↵-Lfogx,y to fogy to do further detection

node will have the final list of all a↵ected transactions detected on its local database. Any
data items updated by any of those a↵ected transactions will be blocked from access until
recovered as they are considered damaged data items. Una↵ected data items will remain
available to users.
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5.7

Experiments and Evaluation
In section 3.6 in chapter 3, we explained the experimental setup, the simulation

environment, and datasets that have been used in detail.

5.7.1

Evaluation of the Third Model: Private Fog Nodes Distribution in Intelligent Government County Model
In this experiment, we aimed to determine if the trusted fog node in the system which

is proposed to manage security matters such as key management and distribution, could play
a leading role in damage assessment. In this model we studied the behavior of the damage
assessment algorithm as it detected a↵ected transactions with di↵ering factors.
We started with a fixed number of fog nodes each time and a di↵erent number of
transactions in each log file. Each time we randomly inserted a malicious transaction and
then classified the results into three di↵erent clusters, or sets, of a↵ected transactions. The
first set comprises less than five identified, a↵ected transactions. The second set contains
ten to fifteen identified, a↵ected transactions, and the third set includes thirty to thirty-five
identified, a↵ected transactions. This clustering is important for making a fair and reasonable
comparison of the proposed algorithms as they are impacted by other factors such as the
number of fog nodes and the number of transactions in each log files. Each transaction
in each set was repeated approximately twenty times, and the total time from inserting
the malicious transaction until all a↵ected transactions were identified in the system was
computed. Then the average for each set was calculated for investigation and evaluation of
our approach. Then we compared the results to determine which factor(s) created a greater
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or lesser impact to the algorithms.

5.7.1.1

First Experiment: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on various fog nodes number

Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 show the relationship between the number of a↵ected
transactions, the number of transactions on each log file, and the average time required by
our system to detect all a↵ected transactions in the whole system. The average time was
calculated by averaging the detection time each set of malicious transactions required. The
result shows that the number of a↵ected transactions that are detected has great e↵ect on
the total time the system remains unavailable. And this applies in all cases, regardless of
the number of fog nodes or the number of transactions on each log file.
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Figure 5.7: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on five fog nodes
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Figure 5.8: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on ten fog nodes
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Figure 5.9: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on fifteen fog nodes
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Figure 5.10: The impact of the di↵erent set of a↵ected transactions on twenty fog nodes

5.7.1.2

Second Experiment: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on
various number of fog nodes

Figures 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 show the relationship between the number of transactions on each log file, and the average time required for our system to detect all a↵ected
transactions in the whole system. The result shows that the number of transactions does not
have a big impact on the total time the system will be unavailable. And this is the case with
all other scenarios, either with a di↵erent number of fog nodes in the system or a di↵erent
set of a↵ected transactions.
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Figure 5.11: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on five fog nodes

Figure 5.12: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on ten fog nodes
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Figure 5.13: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on fifteen fog nodes
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Figure 5.14: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on twenty fog nodes
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5.7.1.3

Third Experiment: The impact of a di↵erent number of transactions
and fog nodes on di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions

This experiment represents the performance of our detection algorithm in identifying
all a↵ected transactions. The following Figures. 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 show the relationship
between the number of transactions on each log file and the number of fog nodes. The sets
of a↵ected transactions that were used in this experiment were fixed at less than five, then
ten to fifteen, and finally to the set of thirty to thirty five.
Figure 5.15 indicates the set of a↵ected transactions was fixed at less than five and
the time needed for our damage assessment algorithm to detect all a↵ected transactions
was slightly increased when the number of fog nodes was increased. This scenario held true
regardless of log file size. The delay that occurred here was due to increasing size in the
global graph. The global graph size usually expands with a rise in transaction dependency,
We observed the global graph increasing in size with both the number of transactions on
each log file and the number of fog nodes. We also observed that the number of transactions
in each log file had little impact on the results. Hence, the log files containing 1000 and 500
transactions took only slightly more time than those containing 100 transactions when we
used the set of less than five a↵ected transactions.
But when the set of a↵ected transactions was fixed at 10 to 15, the results di↵ered,
as seen in Fig. 5.16. Here we see that an increase in the number of fog nodes decreased the
delay time. With the larger set of a↵ected transactions, the global and local graph levels
with small log file size and fewer fog nodes show greater delay than the graphs with large
log files and more fog nodes.
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The set of 30 to 35 a↵ected transactions produced di↵erent findings as shown on
figure 5.17. A small log file of 100 transactions exhibited the same behavior as the previous
set of 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions where the smaller number of fog nodes showed more
time delay. The delay decreased when the number of fog nodes increased. The log files
containing 500 transactions were fairly stable for a bit before showing a decrease in delay
with the increase in fog nodes to 20, minimizing the number of transaction (node) levels on
the graphs. Although, for the 1000 transaction log file the time needed to detect all a↵ected
transactions increased slightly due to global and local graph growth.
To conclude, these experiments prove that the sooner IDS identifies the malicious
transactions the more efficient and faster damage assessment of the a↵ected transactions
can be made. The large spread of a↵ected transactions is the primary cause of delay in our
algorithms. This is due to the rise in the height and depth of the a↵ected sub-tree.
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Figure 5.15: The impact of a di↵erent number of transactions and fog nodes on a set of
less than five a↵ected transactions
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Figure 5.16: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions and fog nodes on set of ten to
fifteen a↵ected Transactions
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Figure 5.17: The impact of a di↵erent number of transactions and fog nodes on a set of 30
-35 a↵ected Transactions
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5.7.1.4

Fourth Experiment: Resource Requirement Cost

Table 5.4 shows the space required to store the global graph file on the trusted fog
node and the local graph files on each pr fog. When the number of fog nodes in the system
or the number of transactions on each fog node increases, the size of the global graph file
will increase. At some point it will exceed the total size of all local graph files combined.
Nonetheless, the largest graph file size our experiment produced was approximately 390 Kilobytes, which is still very small, and will not cause any issue in terms of space requirements,
neither in the trusted fog node nor on pr fog nodes. Therefore this solution is not expensive
in terms of storage requirements since hardware storage today is massive, and all graphs in
our models, which represent real life situations, are sparse and will occupy an insignificant
portion of storage space. Even though, those graphs exceed the worst case space requirement
scenario for the adjacency list which is E = ⇥(V 2 ), when the graph is dense and there exists
an edge between all vertices v of the graph to all other vertices v, it will be the same space
complexity as the adjacency matrix. Keep in mind, this scenario is impossible and in conflict
with our submission regarding the log files since we assume the log must be serializable.
Table 5.4: Storage requirement in Bytes for graph files with existing of trusted fog node
Number
Of
Fog
Nodes
5
10
15
20

Storage Requirement In Bytes
100 Transactions
500 Transactions
1000 Transactions
Global
Total Local Global
Total Local Global
Total Local
Graph
Log Files
Graph
Log Files
Graph
Log Files
3,857
29,535
38,423
177,345
90,978
370,110
7,351
65,200
79,425
400,750
182,027
842,220
12,403
96,600
121,354
603,750
283,796
1302,885
16,725
125,800
166,822
806,580
386,372
1,738,640
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5.7.2

Evaluation of the Third Model: Intelligent Government County System
That Use Public Fog Nodes Distribution Model

5.7.2.1

Fifth Experiment: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on various fog nodes number

The experiment was undertaken on the second model whereby the system has no
trusted fog node. This was attained through the employment of the transaction-dependency
graph system on both prototypes. The experiment’s main purpose was to assess the performance of the damage assessment algorithm during the process of detecting the a↵ected
transactions in the absence of trusted fog node. As earlier described in section 3.6.3.1,
the log files created were based on transaction-dependency relationships that existed within
transactions and were additionally built at the same time as the local and global directed
graphs. For every existing log file, two variable graphs would be produced. One represents
the second model that does not have a trusted fog node (and absence of a global graph) in
the system utilized in the investigations present in section 5.6.
In order to enhance validity of the investigation, repetitive tests were conducted to
ensure fair comparisons of the outcomes from the two models, as depicted in investigations
in section 5.7.1 concerning trusted fog nodes. This was achieved by using a static number
of fog nodes accompanied by a dissimilar number of transactions in every log file. Then we
insert the same malicious transaction that was randomly entered for the first model, whereby
the a↵ected transactions also were grouped in three di↵erent sets or groups. The first group,
fewer than five a↵ected transactions were contained. The second group comprised of about
ten to fifteen transactions that were a↵ected, while the third grouping contained about thirty
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to thirty-five transactions that were a↵ected and had been recognized. The average for each
group was determined in order to examine and appraise our approach. In order to define the
factor(s) impact (great or less) on the algorithms, a comparison of the results was conducted.
Figs.5.18, 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 illustrate the correlation between the number of a↵ected
transactions, the number of transactions in each log file, and the average time required by
our system to detect all maliciously compromised transactions in the whole system. The
average time was calculated by averaging the detection time each fixed set of undamaged
transactions required.
The result shows that the smaller set of less than five a↵ected transactions took an
average of 0.076 milliseconds to 0.079 ms for discovery between the variables in log files and
fog nodes. That time almost doubled for the set containing 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions:
averaging 0.14 ms to 0.15 ms. The final set of 30 to 35 a↵ected transactions, claimed an
average of 0.31 ms to 0.39 ms. Therefore, the number of detected, compromised transactions
has great e↵ect on the total time the system remains unavailable. This applies in all cases,
regardless of the number of fog nodes or the number of transactions held by the log file.

5.7.2.2

Sixth Experiment: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on
various number of fog nodes

Figures 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, and 5.25 demonstrate the relationship between the number
of transactions on each log file and the time requirement, averaged, for discovery of all
a↵ected transactions in the whole system. Overall, the results indicate that the number of
transactions does not have a significant impact on the total delay time which a↵ects system
availability. But, still, there is some small impact.
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Figure 5.18: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on five fog nodes
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Figure 5.19: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on ten fog nodes
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Figure 5.20: The impact of the di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions on fifteen fog nodes
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Figure 5.21: The impact of the di↵erent set of a↵ected transactions on twenty fog nodes
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For example, in the experiment utilizing the set of less than five a↵ected transactions,
the log file of 100 transactions claimed less delay time than the larger log files by almost
0.001 ms to 0.002 ms.
On the other hand, the set of 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions in the log file of 100
transactions demanded more time than the larger log files by 0.01 ms. All other scenarios,
either with a di↵erent number of fog nodes in the system or a di↵erent set of a↵ected
transactions, o↵ered similar results.
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Figure 5.22: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on five fog nodes

5.7.2.3

Seventh Experiment: The impact of a di↵erent number of transactions
and fog nodes on di↵erent sets of a↵ected transactions

Figs. 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28 illustrate the impact of a variable number of transactions
on log file and a variable number of fog nodes. The sets of a↵ected transactions used in this
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Figure 5.23: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on ten fog nodes
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Figure 5.24: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on fifteen fog nodes
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Figure 5.25: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions on twenty fog nodes

experiment were fixed as previously established.
Fig. 5.26 indicates the set of a↵ected transactions as less than five. The time needed
for our damage assessment algorithm to detect all a↵ected transactions increased when the
number of fog nodes increased. This scenario held true regardless of log file size.
The delay that occurred here can be attributed to two primary determinants. First,
a small log file will impact fewer fog nodes than a large log file. Secondly, the local graphs
expand with a rise in transaction dependency. We observed the local graphs in this model
increasing in size with both the number of transactions on each log file and the number of
fog nodes. We also observed that the number of transactions in each log file had little impact
on the results. Hence, the larger log files of 1000 and 500 transactions took only slightly
more time than those of 100 transactions when we used the set of less than five a↵ected
transactions.
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However, the results di↵ered, as seen in Fig. 5.27, when the a↵ected transactions set
was fixed at 10 to 15. Here we see in log files of 100 and 1000 transactions that an increase
in the number of fog nodes decreases the delay time. Also, the log file of 100 transactions
involves more time than the larger log files of 1000 and 500 transactions. But the time is
slightly decreased when the number of fog nodes increases. Generally, what we found is that
the larger set of a↵ected transactions extends on the local graph levels with a small log file
and fewer fog nodes. This explains the greater delay found in this configuration than in that
of the graphs with large log files and more fog nodes.
Thus, the log files of 1000 and 500 transactions perform better than the log file of 100
transactions for two reasons. First, because all a↵ected transactions in the system with the
largest of the log files could be found in perhaps one or two levels of the a↵ected graph, but
with the smaller log file the damage could be found in more than two levels of the a↵ected
graphs. Second, with the smaller log file the damage will a↵ect more fog nodes and that
means more graphs are scanned.
Additionally, in this set of a↵ected transactions, the log file of 500 transactions performs much better than the log file of 1000 transactions because the graph size of 1000
transactions is much larger than the graph size of 500 transactions and necessitates more
time to locate a malicious transaction on the graph.
The set of 30 to 35 a↵ected transactions produced di↵erent findings as seen in Fig.
5.28. The log file of 500 transactions exhibited the same behavior in processing this set as it
did in the previous set of 10 to 15 a↵ected transactions. Where the number of fog nodes is
five, this log file showed better performance compared to the other two log files. Then, the
delay time decreased a bit for the log files of 100 and 1000 transactions when the number of
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fog nodes increased to 10. All the log files at 15 fog nodes closed the gap, and then remained
constant and close at 20 fog nodes. As explained previously, the growth on the graph size,
the increase in the level of a↵ected transactions on the graphs, and the number of fog nodes
that have been a↵ected, have almost the same impact on the delay time.
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Figure 5.26: The impact of a di↵erent number of transactions and fog nodes on a set of
less than five a↵ected transactions

5.7.2.4

Eighth Experiment: Cost of Resource Requirements

The space needed for the storage of local graph files on every fog node is shown
in Table 5.5. A growth in the size of the local graph files is a result of an increase in
the number of transactions in the fog nodes or rather an augmentation of the number of
fog nodes. However, our experiment’s largest graph file was about 15847 kilobytes, which
would be considered as a small size and would, therefore not result in any problems related
to space. This makes the solution derived from the investigation inexpensive because of
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Figure 5.27: The impact of di↵erent number of transactions and fog nodes on set of ten to
fifteen a↵ected Transactions
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Figure 5.28: The impact of a di↵erent number of transactions and fog nodes on a set of 30
-35 a↵ected Transactions
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its space, because it would not require massive storage needs, making it appropriate for
application.
Table 5.5: Storage requirement in Bytes for local graph files with absence of trusted fog
node
Number Of Fog Nodes
5
10
15
20

5.7.3

Storage Requirement In Bytes
100 Transactions 500 Transactions
677
6,594
683
6,822
681
6,852
695
7104

1000 Transactions
15,254
15,392
15,491
15,847

Ninth Experiment: Comparison between having trusted fog node and
not:
We performed this experiment to show the di↵erence between two models: the model

with a trusted fog node (global graph) present in the system and another where there is no
trusted fog node in the system (no global graph) Which is the better performing of the two,
and under which factors? Figs. 5.29, 5.30, and 5.31 show the overall comparison between
these models on the average runtime. The result, illustrated by Fig. 5.29, indicates that
the second model, where there is no trusted fog node, performs better, in terms of execution
time, with the set of less than five a↵ected transactions in almost all cases by 0.001 - 0.002
ms. The explanation for that lies in the use of the global graphs. The first model uses the
global graphs as input for the algorithm and those graphs are larger than the local graphs
that are used as input for the second model. Also the damage caused by the small set of less
than five a↵ected transactions will usually not a↵ect many fog nodes. On average only one
to two fog nodes will be a↵ected. The second model stands out a bit from the first model in
this case.
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However, as seen in Figs. 5.30, and 5.31, the results di↵ered for the two larger sets
of a↵ected transactions. We observed that the model with a trusted fog node required less
time than the model without a trusted fog node by an average of 0.018 ms on the set of 10
to 15 a↵ected transactions. And it is faster than the model that has no trusted fog node by
an average of 0.07 ms on the set of 30 to 35 a↵ected transactions. This is the result of the
damage sustained with the larger set which could a↵ect a greater number of fog nodes. The
second model is required to scan the graph of each a↵ected fog node where the first model
needs to only scan the global graph.
In conclusion, the system benefits from having a trusted fog node when an attack
compromises the database and damage spreads to more than five transactions. Further, the
presence of the global graphs in the system stabilizes the results and speeds the detection
process, minimizing the system’s unavailability.
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Figure 5.29: Comparison between having global graph on trusted fog node and not on a
set of less than five a↵ected transactions
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Figure 5.30: Comparison between having global graph on trusted fog node and not on set
of ten to fifteen a↵ected Transactions
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Figure 5.31: Comparison between having global graph on trusted fog node and not on a
set of 30 -35 a↵ected Transactions

141

6

Conclusion

Fog computing provides benefits to computing performance that traditional cloud
systems do not. Data management in modern smart systems is well-positioned to significantly benefit from the utilization of fog computing. However, as any other data-sharing
system, fog computing is vulnerable to attack and the injection of malicious transactions
into the database. Intrusion detection is one of the main phases that must be included to
ensure the security and reliability of any computing system. This phase uses software or
device to observe the system for any malicious activity or policy violation. However, detection systems sometimes fail to detect several malicious transactions on time, leading to data
damage. Therefore, intrusion detection must be complemented by another phase, namely,
damage assessment and data recovery, which ensures the integrity and availability of system
data. This phase identifies any further a↵ected transactions and ensures that the database
returns to a consistent state. Once the intrusion detection detects the malicious activities, an
appropriate mechanism to assess and recover the damaged data from that attack is required
and should be applied at the earliest opportunity.
Data damage assessment and recovery are fundamental to creating secure and reliable databases. This is particularly true for critical and sensitive data environments such
as healthcare systems, critical infrastructure systems, and intelligent government systems.
When an attack on these vital databases violates the integrity of stored data, the incident
will result in serious consequences, including damage to property and even loss of life. Therefore, in addition to developing appropriate mechanisms for adaptation of fog computing in
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intelligent systems, meeting security requirements to respond to attacks by providing fast
and accurate damage assessment and recovery techniques is definitely necessary. The focus
of this research has been the design of novel models for applying fog technology to modern smart systems. Working with the nature and characteristics of each model, we propose
a unique approach sustaining the integrity of system data in the event of a cyberattack.
Those approaches are designed to maintain the security of systems attacked by malicious
transactions or subjected to fog node data modifications.
For the healthcare systems model, two di↵erent sub-models for applying fog technology to healthcare systems were introduced: fog modules with heterogeneous data, and fog
modules with homogeneous data Working with the nature and characteristics of each model,
we propose unique approach of assessing damaged data. Then we simulated and evaluated
these two sub-models to demonstrate the di↵erence between them and to discover, in consideration of all variables, which of the two is the better performer. We conclude that the model
with homogeneous data stabilizes the results and speeds the detection process, minimizing
the system’s unavailability. Although, the model with heterogeneous data is needed as well
because it is more appropriately applicable to most situations.
For critical infrastructure smart systems model, mainly emphasized the design of a
unique technique for a smart system that uses fog computing technology to control and
manage data. It also proposed a approach that use data dependency to gain the required
information about the damaged part of the a↵ected fog nodes database in order to assess
damage to data caused by an attack. Thus, original data can be recovered, and a database
can be returned to its consistent state as no attacking has occurred to ensure the integrity of
consumer data in a fog computing environment in critical infrastructure systems. The model
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and the proposed approach were designed and implemented to prove its applicability and to
fulfill our goals by running several experiments. First part of experiments aimed to analyze
the behavior of the proposed damage assessment algorithm as it detected a↵ected data items
with varying factors designed for the experiment. And the second half of the experiments
is to measures the performance of our proposed data recovery algorithms in regaining all
damaged data items and restoring their correct values as if no attack occurred.
For the last model we focus on designing novel model for an intelligent government
system that uses fog computing technology to control and manage data. Unique algorithms
that use transaction-dependency graph is implemented in this model to observe and monitor
the activities of every transaction. Once an intrusion detection system detects malicious
activities, the system will promptly detect all a↵ected transactions. Two sub-models were
introduced one requires trusted fog node and the other not. The one with trusted fog node
can be applicable only on the private trusted fog node distribution where the second one is
appropriate for the public or mixed fog nodes distribution. When a malicious transaction is
found, the system is able to identify all a↵ected transactions quickly. Several experiments
were also performed to show the di↵erence between those two mechanisms: one with a
trusted fog node (global graph) present in the system and the other one which no trusted
fog node is required in the system. Finally, we have shown the overall comparison between
them on the average runtime, and which one of them is the better performing, and under
which factors.
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